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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay evaluates restaurant wine pricing. Many 
restaurants offer extensive lists of wines in bottles and limited selections of wines by the glass. In 
this essay, I empirically examine wine prices by the bottle at New York City restaurants. The 
empirical results, which control for both the quality of wine and the restaurant, suggest that 
restaurants offering wine by the glass tend to set the same bottle prices as the restaurants that do 
not offer wine by the glass. This equality in price among restaurants is noteworthy because, 
controlling for quality, restaurants tend to offer a varietal by the glass if and only if they acquire a 
low-cost brand of the varietal. I then construct a theoretical model where either quantity-based 
menu pricing or anchoring could explain the bottle pricing practices that I observe in the empirical 
analysis. 
        In the second essay, I estimate the effects of prolonged coverage in the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) during school age on health care utilization and outcomes, using data 
from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999. Using the 
simulated eligibility as instrument, I identify the causal impacts of CHIP coverage between 1st 
grade and 8th grade on health care utilization, health status, and academic performance among 
middle-school children. The results indicate that an additional year coverage in CHIP increases 
the probability of receiving routine health care by 9 percentage points and the probability of an 
asthma diagnosis by 7 percentage points. However, I cannot detect any impact of CHIP coverage 
on health status and academic performance in 8th grade. 
       In the third essay, I investigate the relationship between human capital accumulation and 
participation in middle school sports, using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, 
2 
Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999. Using the method of instrumental variables, I estimate the causal 
impact of participation in school-sponsored sports on the academic achievement among middle 
school children. The results indicate that participation in school sports increases reading test 
scores, but not test scores in math and science, by 0.27 standard deviations, and that effect is 
mediated through reduced absenteeism. 
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Chapter 1: Restaurant Wine Pricing 
1.1 Introduction 
New York City restaurants Annisa and Robert each offered in July 2015 sauvignon blanc bottles 
with Wine Spectator ratings of 87 for $56. A 2013 Daniel Reverdy Sancerre -- a sauvignon blanc 
Annisa lists on its online wine menu -- has an average retail store price of $26, while a 2014 Matua 
Valley sauvignon blanc -- one Robert posts on its online wine menu -- has an average retail-store 
price of only $11. This anecdote raises the question of why the restaurant prices for these two 
identically-rated wines are the same, despite the apparent difference in wholesale prices as evinced 
by the substantially different average retail-store prices, $26 versus $11. Of course, retail wine 
store and restaurant prices are both disperse (Jaeger and Storchmann, 2011).1 We seek to answer 
this question by focusing on restaurant wine pricing. Restaurants offer food and sell ambiance and 
experience, which means that identical wine sold by restaurants and retail wine stores could be 
considered different products. Furthermore, restaurants offer wines by the glass, whereas retail 
stores mostly do not. We examine the relationship between the features that define restaurants, 
such as wine-quantity menus and quality, and restaurant bottle pricing. 
       Continuing with our opening anecdote, Annisa’s food and service are more highly rated and 
the restaurant is more expensive than Robert. Annisa’s Zagat ratings are 27 (food), 24 (decor), and 
26 (service), while the Robert ratings are 21, 25, and 22. Furthermore, Zagat lists the average cost 
of a meal at Anissa as $99 and at Robert as $69. Therefore, it is curious that Annisa and Robert 
charge identical prices for these identically-rated sauvignon blancs, and it is especially interesting 
                                                          
1 We carefully select our opening anecdote.  
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that the restaurant and retail-store-average price difference (i.e., markup) is $30 = $56 - $26 at 
Annisa and a substantially greater, $45 = $56 - $11, at the lower-rated and less-expensive Robert. 
        In addition to the differences in the food and service ratings and average meal prices of the 
two restaurants, one potentially important factor that distinguishes Annisa and Robert is that 
Robert lists its sauvignon blanc on its online by-the-glass menu, while Annisa posts no by-the-
glass options on its online wine menu. Hence, Annisa does not promote online its sauvignon blanc 
by the glass and possibly does not even offer it by the glass. 
        We examine two factors that affect a restaurant’s bottle price of a particular varietal it offers: 
(a) the quality of the restaurant as measured by the quality of food, decor, and service; and (b) 
whether the restaurant posts the same varietal by the glass on its online wine menu. 
        Restaurants vary by the quality and type of food, decor, and service. Hence, the demand for 
a particular restaurant depends on these factors, and a restaurant’s prices therefore depend on these 
factors as well. In setting prices of food and wine, it is not clear whether a restaurant with better 
decor, for example, would markup only food prices or both food and wine prices. On one hand, 
because almost all restaurant goers order food while only some order alcoholic drinks, a restaurant 
could pass along decor and service costs to all patrons by marking up only food prices. On the 
other hand, if wine drinkers have more price inelastic demands, then a restaurant with nicer, more-
expensive decor may raise wine prices as well. 
        The relationship between whether a restaurant posts online a varietal by the glass and its bottle 
price of the varietal is subtle and could involve three issues related to wine pricing: the wholesale 
prices of the wines offered by the glass, product line options, and anchoring effects.2 Because 
                                                          
2 See Adaval and Wyer Jr (2011) for a characterization of consumer behavioral decision processes as a basis for a retailer using a 
higher-priced product to anchor a consumer’s valuation of a lower-priced product. Ariely et al. (2003) demonstrate that initial 
valuations of familiar products are strongly influenced by even arbitrary anchors. 
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wine-by-the-glass menus tend to be limited, restaurants have the incentive to offer and promote 
high-value wines that they secure at low wholesale prices. If they also offer these wines in bottles, 
then product line and anchoring concerns may drive bottle pricing. 
        We perform an empirical analysis of wine pricing by New York City restaurants. Recognizing 
that the quality of a restaurant’s food, decor, and service and the types of wines the restaurant 
offers and promotes by the glass could affect a restaurant’s bottle pricing strategy, the goal of our 
empirical analysis is to examine the relationship between restaurant attributes (food, decor, and 
service quality and whether restaurants post online by-the-glass wine menus) and measures of 
restaurant wine-pricing strategies (restaurant wine bottle prices, the average retail store prices of 
the wines offered by restaurants, and the differences between restaurant and retail wine store bottle 
prices (i.e., the markup)). We investigate these relationships using data from online by-the-glass 
and bottle wine menus of New York City restaurants, quality ratings of these restaurants, and 
average retail wine store prices. 
        Section 2 presents the data we collected about New York City restaurants. Our empirical 
method is in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our results, and in Section 5 we test robustness of 
our results. 
        In Section 6 we discuss the empirical relationship that we uncover between bottle pricing and 
the quality of food, decor, and service. In our empirical analysis, we uncover a relationship 
between whether a restaurant offers a varietal by the glass and its bottle pricing that warrants a 
theoretical investigation of the practice. In Section 7 we construct a simple linear city model of 
oligopolistic competition to investigate pricing and product line issues. In the model with two 
restaurants and two varietals, each restaurant sells both varietals in bottles. However, for wines by 
the glass, each restaurant sells only the varietal that it acquires at a low cost. In the context of our 
6 
model, we demonstrate that either quantity-based menu pricing or anchoring could drive the 
equilibrium bottle prices of the low-cost wines, which are offered by the glass, and the prices of 
the high-cost wines, which are not offered by the glass, to be identical. In Section 8 we discuss our 
results about the relationship between bottle pricing and glass offerings, and we offer suggestions 
for future research. 
 
1.2 Data 
We compile data from New York City (NYC) restaurants that are rated in the 2015 Zagat review. 
Confining our analysis to NYC allows us to study a set of restaurants in a similar competitive 
environment with access to a similar set of wholesale suppliers. We further reduce heterogeneity 
in our sample by limiting the sample to restaurants that serve the following six types of cuisine: 
American, new American, French, Italian, Mediterranean, and Mexican. These are the most 
common types of restaurants and they are also the most likely to serve wine. Finally, because we 
are interested in restaurants that serve wine, we include in our sample only restaurants that Zagat 
describes as Good for Beer and Wine Only, Good for a Full Bar, Good for Wine, Good for Top 
Wine, or Good for a Wine Bar.3 The 2015 edition of Zagat Surveys reviews 2,961 restaurants in 
NYC. After we subset to restaurants that offer cuisine in the six categories described above and 
serve wine, our sample contains 741 restaurants, of which 400 post their wine menus online. 
        From each restaurant’s online wine menu, we recorded the producer, vineyard designation (if 
specified), year, and bottle prices of the least-expensive wines for each of two common white 
varietals (chardonnay, sauvignon blanc), and two common red varietals (cabernet sauvignon, pinot 
                                                          
3 We use Zagat scores as a measure of consumer perceptions of restaurant quality. Note that Oliver Gergaud and Verardt (2015) 
use Zagat ratings to measure changes in consumer perceptions of quality and restaurant investments in response to restaurant 
ratings by experts.  
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noir). Not all 400 restaurants list bottle prices for each of these varietals. In particular, 314 
restaurants post a price for cabernet sauvignon; 361 post a price for pinot noir; 372 post a 
chardonnay price; and 357 post a sauvignon blanc price. Counting each bottle price as a single 
observation, there are 1,404 bottle prices among the 400 restaurants in our dataset that post their 
wine menus online. Using Wine-Searcher.com, we recorded the average U.S. retail-wine-store 
prices and the Wine Spectator ratings of these wines reported on the site in July 2015.4 We use the 
Wine Spectator ratings as a measure of the quality of each wine. 
        We also recorded from the online wine menus whether the restaurant offers each of the four 
varietals by-the-glass. The number of restaurants that post a by-the-glass price on their online wine 
menus is 202 for cabernet sauvignon; 249 for pinot noir; 281 for chardonnay; and 259 for 
sauvignon blanc. Across all four varietals there are 991 postings of by-the-glass prices among the 
400 restaurants in our dataset with online wine menus. 
        Zagat Surveys provides the average meal cost at each restaurant.5 Zagat also offers scores, 
based on unsolicited consumer reviews, that are normalized to between 0 and 30 for each 
restaurant’s food, decor, and service quality. 6  Zagat maps these scores into the following 
qualitative characterizations of quality: 0-10 is “poor to fair”; 11-15 is “fair to good”; 16-20 is 
“good to very good”; 21-25 is “very good to excellent”; and 26-30 is “extraordinary to perfection”. 
Because only 4% of scores are above 25 and below 16, we group these scores into a low score 
category of less than or equal to 20, and a high score category of above 20. 
                                                          
4 Wine-Search.com currently lists prices posted by approximately 6,300 U.S. wine stores. The website states that these average 
prices are calculated using the following methodology: “Average prices are calculated from a ‘topped and tailed’ data set. We 
remove the highest and lowest 20% to prevent the average being skewed by pricing errors. When only a small number of prices 
are available the median is used.” 
http://www.wine-search.com/average-price.lml 
5 Meal costs are the average consumer-reported prices charged for one dinner including one appetizer, one entree, one drink, and 
tip. 
6 These 30-point scale ratings were converted to 1-5 star ratings on July 26th, 2016.  
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1.3 Empirical Method 
We use the restaurant bottle price of wine, the average wine store retail price of wine, and the 
difference between restaurant and retail wine store bottle price (markup) as separate outcomes in 
our empirical model. Because these price data are available from only restaurants that post their 
wine menus online, we use a two-part model (TPM; Duan et al. (1983)) to explicitly account for 
the decision to post the wine menu online and the level of the price outcomes.7 We specify the first 
stage as a Probit model of the probability that the restaurant posts a wine menu online: 
                                                     𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜱(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑧1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽2)                                      (1.1)                                     
where i denotes a varietal, j denotes a restaurant, x’1ij is a vector of indicators for a high score for 
food, service, and decor (i.e., a Zagat score greater than 20), and z’1ij is a vector of control variables 
for the six different types of cuisine (American, New American, French, Italian, Mexican, and 
Mediterranean) and 20 different neighborhoods where the restaurants are located. 
        Because our price outcomes are right-skewed we model the second stage of the TPM using 
a log-linear OLS regression: 
                      Log(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 > 0) = 𝛼0 + 𝑥1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼1 + 𝑥2𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼2 + 𝑧1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼3 + 𝑧2𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼4 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗             (1.2) 
where Yij is either the restaurant bottle price, the retail wine store average price, or the markup. 
The vector x’2ij contains the wine score and an indicator variable that is set to one if the restaurant 
lists wines by the glass on its online wine menu and set to zero otherwise. The vector z’2ij includes 
indicators for each varietal (chardonnay, sauvignon blanc, cabernet sauvignon, pinot noir) and for 
the 20 neighborhoods in NYC. 
                                                          
7 An alternative would be to use a sample selection model Heckman (1979). However, Manning et al. (1987) demonstrate using a 
Monte Carlo study that the two-part model outperforms the sample selection model when there is no exclusion restriction to aid 
identification of the first stage, which is the case here. 
9 
        The conditional expectation of the three outcomes for the full sample of all NYC restaurant, 
irrespective of whether they post their wine menus online, is derived as: 
 E(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝑥1𝑖𝑗 , 𝑥2𝑖𝑗 , 𝑧1𝑖𝑗 , 𝑧2𝑖𝑗) = 𝜱(𝛽0 + 𝑥1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽1 + 𝑧1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽2)∅𝑠exp⁡(𝛼0 + 𝑥1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼1 + 𝑥2𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼2 + 𝑧1𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼3 +
𝑧2𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛼4)                                                                                                                                        (1.3) 
where ϕs is Duan’s nonparametric (Duan, 1983) smearing factor, which is used to retransform the 
second stage estimates back to the dollar scale. The smearing factor is computed as: ∅̂𝑠 =
1
𝑛
∑ exp(𝜀?̂?𝑗)𝑖𝑗 , where is the number of wines posted online, and 𝜀?̂?𝑗 is the estimated residual from 
the second stage of the model. 
 
1.4 Results 
First, in Table 1.1 we present summary statistics of the continuous Zagat scores for food, decor, 
and service; the average restaurant meal cost; the Wine Spectator wine score; and our three price 
outcomes by whether or not the restaurant posts varietals by-the-glass on its online wine menu. 
        While the restaurants that post by-the-glass prices on their online wine menus offer similarly-
rated wines at similar prices as restaurants that do not post by-the-glass prices, the wines offered 
by restaurants that post by-the-glass wines have lower wine store retail prices, and as a result, a 
higher markup.8 The average difference in the markup between the two groups is $4.87. 
        Table 1.2 contains marginal effects of the key regressions calculated for the first part 
(probability of posting the wine menu online) and second part (price measure conditional on 
posting the menu online) of the TPM separately as well as the full TPM (unconditional price 
measure). The standard errors of the marginal effects are clustered at the restaurant level. Only the 
                                                          
8 The p-value of the t-test over equality of the retail prices between the two groups of restaurants is < 0.00. 
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decor score is statistically significant in the first stage of the TPM, and indicates that the probability 
of posting a by-the-glass wine menu online is 11 percentage points higher among restaurants with 
high decor scores. All of the Zagat scores are precisely estimated in the second stage of the TPM 
when the outcome is either the bottle markup or the restaurant bottle price. They indicate that 
higher scores are associated with higher restaurant bottle prices for wine and higher markups 
among restaurants that post their wine menus online. For example, restaurants in this conditional 
sample with high decor scores sell bottles for $9.31 more than restaurants with low decor scores, 
resulting in a $5.43 increase in markup. The markup is also positively associated with higher Wine 
Spectator scores for the four varietals we consider and is $7.74 per bottle higher when the 
restaurant posts by-the-glass prices on its online menu. 
        The total marginal effect estimates that generalize to our full sample of restaurants, 
irrespective of whether they post their wine menus online, indicate that a high Zagat decor rating 
is associated with the largest increase in the markup; an increase of nearly $8 per bottle.9 Most of 
the difference is due to restaurants with nice decor charging higher bottle prices, although they do 
also select wines to sell with higher average retail prices. Posting by-the-glass prices is also 
associated with a $5.89 per bottle increase in the markup. Notably, all of the increase is due to the 
fact that, for a given Wine spectator rating, restaurants posting by-the-glass prices sell wine with 
a lower average retail price. 
 
1.5 Generalization of Results 
                                                          
9 For a dummy variable D, the index function is 𝑥′𝑏 + 𝛼𝐷. Let b1 denote the coefficients of all regressors except for the dummy in 
the first stage, and b2 denote the coefficients in the second stage. 
∂E(y|x)
∂D
= ∅(𝑥′𝑏1 + 𝛼)∅𝑠 exp(𝑥
′𝑏2 + 𝛼) − ∅(𝑥
′𝑏1)∅𝑠exp⁡(𝑥
′𝑏2). 
For a continuous variable x1 with a coefficient β11 in the first stage and a coefficient β21 in the second stage, 
∂E(y|x)
∂𝑥1
=
∅(𝑥′𝑏1 + 𝛼𝐷)∅𝑠𝛽11 exp(𝑥
′𝑏2 + 𝛼𝐷) + ∅(𝑥
′𝑏1 + 𝛼𝐷)∅𝑠𝛽21exp⁡(𝑥
′𝑏2 + 𝛼𝐷). 
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Our sample contains all the NYC restaurants of six different cuisine types that are reviewed by 
Zagat. Because maintaining a Zagat rating is costly, the restaurants that are reviewed by Zagat may 
price wine differently from restaurants that are not reviewed. To investigate this possibility, we 
collected data on wine prices and restaurant characteristics for all restaurants in the West Village 
neighborhood of lower Manhattan.10 We chose this neighborhood to test the generalizability of our 
results because it contains a large number of restaurants and is relatively easy to define as a market 
area. 
        For this sample of restaurants, we use data from Google Maps to control for restaurant cost 
and quality. Google Maps provides a rating score for total meal cost ranging from one-dollar sign 
to four-dollar signs, and an overall quality score ranging from one star to five stars. The quality 
scores are calculated as the average rating submitted by customers to Google. Of the 141 
restaurants in the West Village, 91 are reviewed by Zagat and the other 50 are not. Using this 
sample of restaurants, we estimate a log linear model of markup, restaurant price and retail wine 
store price with a similar specification to the second part of our TPM. The only difference between 
this and our earlier model is that the indicators for high Zagat scores for food, decor and service 
are replaced by indicators for a high overall quality (score ≥ 4), a high meal cost (score ≥ 3), an 
indicator variable for whether the restaurant was reviewed by Zagat, and exclusion of the dummies 
for different neighborhoods. 
        The marginal effect estimates for selected variables are reported in table 1.3. Notably, the 
indictor variable for whether the restaurant is Zagat-reviewed is imprecisely estimated for all three 
price measures, although the point estimates suggest a smaller markup among restaurants reviewed 
                                                          
10 This area is roughly bounded by the Hudson River on the west and Sixth Avenue on the east, extending from West 14th Street 
south to West Houston Street.  
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by Zagat. As with Zagat-reviewed restaurants, Google-reviewed restaurants that post by-the-glass 
wines select wines with lower retail store prices, resulting in a higher markup. However, the 
increase in markup for restaurants in this particular neighborhood is much lower than in our full 
sample of Zagat-review restaurants. Overall, these results are consistent with those from our Zagat-
reviewed sample, suggesting that our main results are generalizable to all NYC restaurants. 
        Another concern is that we record the availability of glassed wine options through restaurants’ 
online wine menus. It is possible that restaurants without an online glass program may also 
promote their glassed wines offline. In that case, online and offline promotions could generate 
different effectiveness on profitability, including markup (Zhang and Wedel, 2009). We attempt 
to examine whether there are different effects of by-the-glass option on wine prices and markup 
between restaurants promoting glass options online and those which may promote glass options 
offline. We rerun the log linear model of markup, restaurant price and retail wine store price on a 
subsample of restaurants with an online glassed wine program (i.e., a restaurant offers any of the 
four varietals by the glass). Notably, the by-the-glass option points to a specific varietal. Of the 
338 restaurants in this subsample, they post 989 glassed varietal prices. 
        The marginal effects of the subsample of restaurants are reported in Table 1.4. The results are 
very similar to those of our originally full sample. It suggests that the higher markup associated 
with the by-the-glass option in our baseline model is not driven by the potential difference in 
sophistication between restaurants do online promotions and those do not. 
 
1.6 Discussion: Bottle Pricing and Restaurant Quality 
We believe that possible explanations of the relationships we uncover between the three measures 
of restaurant quality and the three price measures (the restaurant prices of wine bottles, the retail 
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prices of wines offered by restaurants, and the markup) are straightforward. Considering decor, 
high scores are associated with higher restaurant bottle prices and higher markups because 
restaurants could be passing higher costs of decor, which are associated with higher decor scores, 
at least in part, to wine drinkers. Furthermore, restaurants may optimally set higher wine bottle 
prices because nicer decor improves the wine experience. The association between service quality 
and wine prices borders on conventional statistical insignificance and has a weak economic 
relationship possibly because customers pay for better service through higher tips.11 High food 
scores are not associated with bottle prices, which could indicate that restaurants are not passing 
along the higher cost of high quality food to wine drinkers, possibly because nearly all restaurant 
goers eat food. 
 
1.7 Theoretical Analysis: Bottle Pricing and Wines By-the-Glass 
In a theoretical model with two restaurants, we characterize equilibria that match our empirical 
results. Specifically, both restaurants set the same prices for the identically-rated bottles of a 
varietal they offer. They do so in spite of having different costs of the wines - acquiring the wines 
at different prices. They set the same prices in part because the restaurant that has acquired the 
varietal at a lower price also offers it by the glass, and the restaurant that acquired the varietal at a 
higher price, does not. Therefore, empirically and in the context of our theoretical model, despite 
acquiring the wines at different prices, the glass option at only the restaurant with the lower-cost 
wine drives the restaurants to set the same bottle prices. 
                                                          
11 P-values between 0.05 and 0.10 are not considered conventionally low enough to reject the null hypothesis by the statistician 
Ronald Fisher.  
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        In the model, restaurant goers (consumers) who prefer to drink their favored varietal by the 
glass drive this pricing equilibrium. Specifically, it is the choices by these light drinkers when their 
preferred varietal is not offered by the glass that affects the equilibrium prices. When their 
preferred varietals are not offered by the glass, if they choose glasses of another varietal, then we 
offer one possible explanation - a rationale that involves a restaurant using its bottle price of a 
varietal as an anchor for its glass offering of the varietal. Alternatively, if they choose bottles of 
their preferred varietal when glasses of it are not offered, then we offer another explanation for the 
equilibrium - a rationale that involves quantity-based menu pricing. 
        In our simple model, two restaurants, 1 and 2, compete by setting prices for two varietals: 
merlot (m) and pinot noir (n). All four wines - both varietals sold by restaurant 1 and both sold by 
restaurant 2 - have identical ratings. However, to investigate theoretically the relationship that we 
uncover in our empirical analysis between the prices that restaurants pay for their wines and the 
prices they set for their customers, the restaurants acquire their wines at different prices. In 
particular, restaurant 1 has secured a lower-cost m and a higher-cost n from its supplier, and 
restaurant 2 has secured a higher-cost m and a lower-cost n from its supplier. We let c denote the 
price a restaurant pays its supplier per bottle of a lower-cost wine, and we let c denote the price a 
restaurant pays its supplier per bottle of a higher-cost wine. 
        In our empirical analysis we uncover the practice that restaurants tend to offer the wines that 
they acquire at lower prices, controlling for quality, by the glass. In the spirit of this relationship, 
we assume in this theory model that each restaurant sells only its lower-cost wine by the glass.12 
                                                          
12 In a model in which the number of wines by-the-glass and in bottles is endogenous, restaurants could offer a limited equilibrium 
number of wines by-the-glass if either: (1) those who have stronger preferences for limited quantities also have weaker 
preferences for specific varietals; or (2) due to spoilage from leftover wine in bottles or due to the cost of storage systems, the 
cost per glass served is increasing in the number of varietals offered.  
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Specifically, by the glass, restaurant 1 sells only m and restaurant 2 sells only n. We also assume 
the quantity of wine per glass is the restaurant standard of 150 ml, which equals 1/5 of a standard 
750 ml bottle. The cost for restaurant 1 of selling q1bm bottles and q1gm glasses of m and q1bn bottles 
of n is 
𝐶1(𝑞1𝑏𝑚, 𝑞1𝑔𝑚, 𝑞1𝑏𝑛) = 𝑐 ∙ (𝑞1𝑏𝑚 +
𝑞1𝑔𝑚
5
) + 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞1𝑏𝑛. 
The cost for restaurant 2 of selling q2bm bottles of m and q2bn and q2gn bottles of n is 
𝐶2(𝑞2𝑏𝑚, 𝑞2𝑔𝑚, 𝑞2𝑏𝑛) = 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞2𝑏𝑚 + 𝑐 (𝑞2𝑏𝑛 +
𝑞2𝑔𝑚
5
). 
        Our model is standard in the sense that consumers have preferences for restaurants, quantities 
of wine, and varietals. However, it is non-standard in that the utility of consuming a glass of a 
particular varietal at a restaurant may directly depend on the restaurant’s bottle price of the varietal. 
If so, a varietal’s bottle price may serve as an anchor for a consumer’s willingness to pay for a 
glass of the varietal. 
        The restaurants compete in a variant of the standard Hotelling linear model with quantity as 
well as horizontal differentiation. Our model has a unit mass of consumers, each with a base value, 
v, of dining at one of the two restaurants. The consumers differ in four dimensions. First, a 
parameter x, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], describes consumer tastes for the two 
restaurants. A consumer located at x on the line spends τx to “travel” to restaurant 1 and spends 
τ(1-x) to travel to restaurant 2. Second, each consumer is either a heavy drinker or a light drinker. 
For heavy drinkers, the marginal value of increasing wine consumption from one glass to one 
bottle is θ = θℎ; and for light drinkers, the marginal value of increasing wine consumption from 
one glass to one bottle is θ = θ𝑙, where θℎ > θ𝑙 ≥ 0.
13
 We let λ denote the proportion of heavy 
                                                          
13 Our model does not consider restaurant goers in parties of four or more who are light drinkers. In this case, if light drinkers 
could coordinate on a particular bottle or bottles of wine, then each person could drink only one glass. Incorporating this 
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drinkers and 1- λ denote the proportion of light drinkers. Third, one-half of the consumers prefer 
wine m to wine n and the other half prefer wine n to wine m. We let ψ = 𝜓 ∈ (1/2,1) denote the 
value to a consumer from his or her preferred varietal, and ψ = 𝜓 = 1 − 𝜓 ∈ (0,1/2) denote the 
value to a consumer from his or her less-preferred wine. Fourth, consumers differ by their marginal 
utility of income, which we denote as α. We normalize the marginal utility of income for heavy 
drinkers at 𝛼ℎ = 1, and assume that light drinkers have a marginal utility of income that is no less 
than one, 𝛼𝑙 > 1. In our model, heavy drinkers may drink more than light drinkers either because 
they prefer larger quantities, θ or because they have a smaller marginal opportunity cost of their 
income, α.  
        To incorporate the possibility of a price anchor, the utility of consuming a glass of m at 
restaurant 1 includes a component βp1bm, and the utility of consuming a glass of n at restaurant 2 
includes a component βp2bn. 
        A consumer located at x with values α, θ, ψ, and β has utility specified in equation (1.4) as 
follow:   
𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + θ − τx − α𝑝1𝑏𝑚 if one bottle of m at 1;                 
𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + θ − τx − α𝑝1𝑏𝑛 if one bottle of n at 1; 
𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + β𝑝1𝑏𝑚θ − τx − α𝑝1𝑔𝑚 if one glass of m at 1; 
𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + θ − τ(1 − x) − α𝑝2𝑏𝑚 if one bottle of m at 2;      
𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + θ − τ(1 − x) − α𝑝2𝑏𝑛 if one bottle of n at 2; 
                       𝑈𝑥,𝜃,ψ = 𝑣 + ψ + β𝑝2𝑏𝑛θ − τ(1 − x) − α𝑝2𝑔𝑛 if one glass of n at 2.               (1.4)      
                                                          
possibility into our model would not affect our qualitative results.  
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        For our analysis, we need to partition the market for restaurant goers into four segments: (1) 
heavy drinkers who prefer m; (2) heavy drinkers who prefer n; (3) light drinkers who prefer m; and 
(4) light drinkers who prefer n.    
        To analyze whether menu pricing considerations or anchoring drives the equilibrium prices 
of bottles to be identical, regardless of the prices paid by restaurants to acquire the wines, we 
consider two cases about the preferences of light drinkers: (a) they drink only one glass of wine, 
𝜃𝑙 = 0; and (b) they drink only their preferred varietal, 𝜓 = 1 − 𝜓 = 0.
14      
        Case 1: Anchoring. In this case, the light drinker and heavy drinker markets are segmented 
in the sense that (a) light drinkers select only one glass and heavy drinkers select bottles and (b) in 
equilibrium, each segment strictly prefers its selected quantity. With bottle and glass markets 
segmented in this manner, we show that anchoring can explain the sellers’ practice of setting the 
same equilibrium bottle prices. 
        To derive the demand function for each restaurant’s wine offerings, for each of the four 
market segments, we need to derive the consumer who is indifferent between dining at restaurants 
1 and 2. From the utility function specified in (1.4), these indifferent consumers are the following.15 
For a light drinker who prefers m: 
?̂?𝑙𝑚 ≡
1
2
+
(2𝜓 − 1) + (𝑝2𝑔𝑛 − 𝑝1𝑔𝑚) + 𝛽(𝑝1𝑏𝑚 − 𝑝2𝑏𝑛)
2𝜏
 
For a light drinker who prefers n: 
                                                          
14 Note that our goal in evaluating wine pricing theoretically is to provide an explanation of the factor that are related to 
restaurants tending to set identical bottle prices. In evaluating wine pricing, we demonstrate that an identical-bottle-pricing 
equilibrium exists for certain parameter values of our model. However, we do not evaluate the robustness of the equilibria. We 
do not because our goal is to explain our empirical results, where we uncover only that restaurants set the same prices on average. 
We do not establish that they set the same prices for entire ranges of variables describing consumer preferences.  
15 To simplify the notation in the Case 1 analysis, we set 𝛼𝑙 = 1. 
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?̂?𝑙𝑛 ≡
1
2
+
(1 − 2𝜓) + (𝑝2𝑔𝑛 − 𝑝1𝑔𝑚) + 𝛽(𝑝1𝑏𝑚 − 𝑝2𝑏𝑛)
2𝜏
 
For a heavy drinker who prefers m: 
?̂?ℎ𝑚 ≡
1
2
+
(𝑝2𝑏𝑚 − 𝑝1𝑏𝑚)
2𝜏
 
For a heavy drinker who prefers n: 
?̂?ℎ𝑛 ≡
1
2
+
(𝑝2𝑏𝑛 − 𝑝1𝑏𝑛)
2𝜏
 
With these cutoffs (i.e., demand functions) in place, restaurant 1’s profit function is 
𝜋1 = (𝑝1𝑔𝑚 −
𝑐
4
) (?̂?𝑙𝑚 + ?̂?𝑙𝑛) + (𝑝1𝑏𝑚 − 𝑐)?̂?ℎ𝑚 + (𝑝1𝑏𝑛 − 𝑐)?̂?ℎ𝑛 
and restaurant 2’s profit function is 
𝜋2 = (𝑝2𝑔𝑛 −
𝑐
4
) (2 − ?̂?𝑙𝑚 − ?̂?𝑙𝑛) + (𝑝2𝑏𝑚 − 𝑐)(1 − ?̂?ℎ𝑚) + (𝑝2𝑏𝑛 − 𝑐)(1 − ?̂?ℎ𝑛) 
        To simplify our analysis, we characterize a Nash equilibrium for a case in which a heavy 
drinker’s value of a bottle is “large” in the sense that in equilibrium, a heavy drinker strictly prefers 
consuming a bottle to consuming a glass. With regard to light drinkers, by assumption 𝜃𝑙 = 0 and 
𝜓 > 0, they do not consume bottles. As a result, we can solve for the equilibrium glass prices 
separately from the equilibrium bottle prices. 
        If a heavy drinker’s marginal value of a bottle, h, is sufficiently large, 
𝜃ℎ > max⁡{
7
15
𝑐 +
1
3
𝑐 +
2
3
𝛽
1 − λ
λ
, (1 − 2𝜓) +
2
15
𝑐 +
2
3
𝑐 +
4
3
𝛽
1 − λ
λ
} 
then in a Nash equilibrium, the prices of the restaurants’ low-cost bottles are 
𝑝1𝑏𝑚
∗ = 𝑝2𝑏𝑛
∗ = τ +
1
3
(2𝑐 + 𝑐 + 2β
1 − λ
λ
) 
the prices of the restaurants’ high-cost bottles are 
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𝑝1𝑏𝑛
∗ = 𝑝2𝑏𝑚
∗ = τ +
1
3
(𝑐 + 2𝑐 + 4β
1 − λ
λ
) 
and the prices of the restaurants’ glasses are 
𝑝1𝑔𝑚
∗ = 𝑝2𝑔𝑛
∗ = τ +
𝑐
5
 
        We are concerned with comparing the prices of low-cost bottles (which the restaurants also 
offer by the glass) and high-cost bottles (which they do not offer by the glass). At each restaurant 
the equilibrium price of the high-cost wine less the equilibrium price of the low-cost wine is: 
𝑝1𝑏𝑚
∗ − 𝑝1𝑏𝑛
∗ = 𝑝2𝑏𝑛
∗ − 𝑝2𝑏𝑚
∗ =
1
3
(𝑐 − 𝑐) −
2
3
βτ
1 − λ
λ
 
        Without an effect of a restaurant’s bottle price on the utility of consuming a glass (i.e., an 
anchoring effect), β = 0, the restaurants’ equilibrium bottle prices of the high-cost wines are 
greater than the equilibrium bottle prices of the low-cost wines. However, with an anchoring effect, 
β > 0, it is possible that the restaurants set identical bottle prices for their low-cost and high-cost 
wines. Specifically, if the magnitude of the anchoring effect on the bottle prices of low-cost wines, 
2
3
βτ
1−λ
λ
, equals the 1/3 the difference in the cost of high-cost and low-cost wines, 
1
3
(𝑐 − 𝑐), then 
𝑝1𝑏𝑚
∗ = 𝑝1𝑏𝑛
∗ = 𝑝2𝑏𝑛
∗ = 𝑝2𝑏𝑚
∗ . 
        Case 2: Quantity-Based Menu Pricing. In this case, light drinkers select only their preferred 
varietals. Thus, for the high-cost varietal, which a restaurant offers in bottles only, it prices the 
varietal to attract not only heavy drinkers who prefer this high-cost varietal, but also light drinkers 
who also prefer it. However, for its low-cost varietal, which it offers in bottles and by the glass, it 
prices bottles of this varietal to attract only heavy drinkers who prefer this low-cost varietal, and 
it prices glasses to attract only light drinkers who prefer it. As we demonstrate, this case can create 
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a scenario in which each restaurant sets the same equilibrium price for its low- and high-cost 
varietals. 
        To derive the demand function for each restaurant’s wine offerings, for each of the four 
market segments, we need to derive the consumer who is indifferent between dining at restaurants 
1 and 2. From the utility function specified in (1.4), these indifferent consumers are the following. 
For a light drinker who prefers m: 
?̂?𝑙𝑚 ≡
1
2
+
−𝜃𝑙 + 𝛼𝑙(𝑝2𝑔𝑚 − 𝑝1𝑔𝑚)
2𝜏
 
For a light drinker who prefers n: 
?̂?𝑙𝑛 ≡
1
2
+
𝜃𝑙 + 𝛼𝑙(𝑝2𝑔𝑛 − 𝑝1𝑔𝑛)
2𝜏
 
For a heavy drinker who prefers m: 
?̂?ℎ𝑚 ≡
1
2
+
(𝑝2𝑏𝑚 − 𝑝1𝑏𝑚)
2𝜏
 
For a heavy drinker who prefers n: 
?̂?ℎ𝑛 ≡
1
2
+
(𝑝2𝑏𝑛 − 𝑝1𝑏𝑛)
2𝜏
 
With these cutoffs (i.e., demand functions) in place, restaurant 1’s profit function is 
𝜋1 = (𝑝1𝑔𝑚 −
𝑐
4
) ?̂?𝑙𝑚 + (𝑝1𝑏𝑚 − 𝑐)?̂?ℎ𝑚 + (𝑝1𝑏𝑛 − 𝑐)(?̂?𝑙𝑛 + ?̂?ℎ𝑛) 
and restaurant 2’s profit function is 
𝜋2 = (𝑝2𝑔𝑛 −
𝑐
4
) (1 − ?̂?𝑙𝑛) + (𝑝2𝑏𝑚 − 𝑐)(2 − ?̂?𝑙𝑚 − ?̂?ℎ𝑚) + (𝑝2𝑏𝑛 − 𝑐)(1 − ?̂?ℎ𝑛) 
        As in Case 1, we characterize a Nash equilibrium for parameter values in which a heavy 
drinker strictly prefers consuming a bottle to consuming a glass (h is sufficiently large). In 
addition, a light drinker strictly prefers consuming a bottle of her preferred varietal to a glass of 
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her less-preferred varietal (l is sufficiently large and 𝜓 = 0). As a result, we can solve for the 
Hotelling equilibrium bottle prices separately from solving for the Hotelling equilibrium glass 
prices. 
        For certain parameter values of our model, a Nash equilibrium exists in which the firms set 
identical bottle prices for each of the varietals. Specifically, for any 𝜃ℎ > 𝜃𝑙, τ > 𝑐 − 𝑐, and α ≥
1, if 
𝜃𝑙 =
7
10
𝛼𝑙𝑐 +
1
2
𝛼𝑙𝜏 + 𝜏 
λ = 1 −
20(𝑐 − 𝑐)
20(1 − 𝛼𝑙)(𝑐 − 𝑐) + 25𝛼𝑙𝜏 − 40𝜏 + 𝛼𝑙𝑐
 
and in equilibrium ?̂?𝑙𝑚, ?̂?𝑙𝑛 ∈ (0,1) in particular, then a Nash equilibrium exists in which the 
restaurants set prices: 
𝑝1𝑔𝑚
∗ = 𝑝1𝑔𝑛
∗ = 𝑝2𝑔𝑚
∗ = 𝑝2𝑔𝑛
∗ = 𝑐 + τ 
and 
𝑝1𝑔𝑚
∗ = 𝑝2𝑔𝑛
∗ =
𝑐 + 𝜏
4
 
        Summary of Cases and 1 and 2. We characterized equilibria for Cases 1 and 2 in which the 
two restaurants set identical bottle prices for the two varietals, m and n. In these two cases, each 
restaurant sells only its low-cost wine (m for restaurant 1 and n for restaurant 2) by the glass. 
        In Case 1, if a restaurant does not offer a light drinker’s preferred varietal by the glass, then 
he or she orders a glass of the other varietal. Therefore, if light drinkers have a strong preference 
to drink only a glass of wine and a weak preference for varietals, then we demonstrate that 
anchoring can cause the empirical pricing practice that we uncover. In Case 2, if a restaurant does 
not offer a light drinker’s preferred varietal by the glass, then he or she orders a bottle of this 
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preferred varietal. Therefore, if light drinkers have a strong preference for varietals and a weak 
preference to drink only a glass of wine, then we demonstrate that a price-quantity menu (i.e., a 
glass price and a bottle price) for the low-cost varietal and only a bottle price for the high-cost 
varietal can cause the empirical pricing practice that we uncover. 
 
1.8 Discussion: Bottle Pricing and Wines By-the-Glass 
The association we uncover between whether a restaurant offers a varietal by the glass and the 
bottle pricing and markup of the varietal we believe is most interesting. It points to a remaining 
question about restaurant wine offering and pricing strategy. Which rationale - price anchoring or 
quantity-based menu pricing - drives the restaurants to set identical prices for lower-cost wines 
offered by the glass and higher-cost wines offered only in bottles? It may be that restaurants 
purchase greater quantities of wines with lower retail store prices, but instead of passing those 
savings along to consumers in the form of lower bottle prices, they maintain higher prices in order 
to make these wines by the glass look more appealing to their customers. Alternatively, or as a 
complementary pricing strategy, restaurants may set prices of the higher-cost wines they serve 
only in bottles at a level to encourage light drinkers to purchase bottles. The former strategy is 
consistent with anchoring and the latter with quantity-based menu pricing. 
        Which of these two strategies explains why restaurants have higher markups for wines offered 
by the glass, in the context of our theoretical model, depends on the preferences of light drinkers. 
In Case 1 of our theoretical model, light drinkers consume only wines by the glass; and in Case 2, 
they consume only their preferred varietal. Therefore, the Case-1 anchoring rationale for the 
equilibrium pricing requires that light drinkers have a strong preference to drink only one glass of 
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wine, and the Case-2 menu pricing rationale for the equilibrium pricing requires that light drinkers 
have a strong preference to drink their preferred varietal, regardless of the quantity. 
        An interesting issue for future research is about whether light wine drinkers have stronger 
preferences for quantity or varietals. As we demonstrated, determining these preferences would be 
critical in determining whether a standard menu pricing argument explains our results or a 
behavioral anchoring argument does so. Although we cannot distinguish these mechanisms in our 
empirical analysis, our own view is that anchoring is the more likely explanation. It is because we 
believe that light drinkers probably have less knowledge of wine and weaker preferences for 
specific varietals, thereby causing them to favor quantity. Identifying these causal pathways is a 
fruitful area of research for future studies that make use of data on restaurant wine sales and 
consumer attributes. 
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1.9 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1  Summary Statistics  
 
 Restaurants without By-the-Glass Varietal Posted 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Food Score 22.591 2.362 15 28 413 
Decor Score 19.288 2.780 12 27 413 
Service Score 20.998 2.270 15 27 413 
Average Meal Price 55.801 15.565 23 128 413 
Wine Score 87.004 3.160 60 93 413 
Restaurant Wine Price 58.523 26.380 17 180 413 
Retail Wine Price 24.666 13.414 6 119 413 
Markup 33.857 18.105 2 105 413 
            
 Restaurants with By-the-Glass Varietal Posted 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Food Score 21.972 2.542 13 29 991 
Decor Score 20.030 3.085 13 28 991 
Service Score 20.660 2.582 14 28 991 
Average Meal Price 56.677 21.475 17 167 991 
Wine Score 86.600 2.626 75 93 991 
Restaurant Wine Price 57.298 19.016 20 160 991 
Retail Wine Price 18.569 8.881 5 96 991 
Markup 38.728 14.600 2 116 991 
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Table 1.2: Marginal Effects from Two Part Model - All Wines 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Markup Restaurant Price Retail Price 
Probability of Wine Menus Online  
High Food Score 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
High Decor Score 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
High Service Score 0.034 0.034 0.034 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Price Measure (Conditional on Posting Online) 
High Food Score 2.261*** 4.133*** 2.725*** 
 (1.178) (1.145) (0.518) 
High Decor Score 5.429*** 9.309*** 3.457*** 
 (1.339) (1.197) (0.517) 
High Service Score 1.579* 1.818** 0.284 
 (0.989) (1.072) (0.518) 
Wine Score 0.399*** 1.851*** 1.330*** 
 (0.154) (0.185) (0.122) 
By-the-Glass 7.736*** 1.003 -5.668*** 
  (1.166) (1.208) (0.587) 
Unconditional Price Measure   
High Food Score 1.954 3.460 2.176*** 
 (1.755) (2.171) (0.812) 
High Decor Score 7.969*** 13.035*** 4.737*** 
 (1.868) (2.117) (0.775) 
High Service Score 2.429* 3.341* 0.923 
 (1.452) (1.919) (0.762) 
Wine Score 0.297** 1.401*** 1.007*** 
 (0.118) (0.165) (0.106) 
By-the-Glass 5.886*** 0.739 -4.363*** 
  (1.146) (1.254) (0.567) 
N 1,959 1,959 1,959 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the restaurant level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.3: Test of Selectin into Zagat Review Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Markup Restaurant Price Retail Price 
Log-Linear Regression   
High Meal Cost 0.269*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 
 (0.095) (0.052) (0.066) 
High Overall Quality 0.025 0.102 0.252** 
 (0.107) (0.076) (0.097) 
Wine Score 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.014** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
By-the-Glass 0.319*** 0.034 -0.233*** 
 (0.112) (0.065) (0.077) 
Zagat Review -0.099 -0.029 0.068 
 (0.097) (0.072) (0.088) 
N 235 235 235 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the restaurant level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4: Marginal Effects of Restaurants with a Glass Program 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Markup Restaurant Price Retail Price 
Log-Linear Regression   
High Food Score -1.107 0.862 2.133*** 
 (1.091) (1.220) (0.545) 
High Decor Score 7.141*** 10.243*** 3.422*** 
 (1.093) (1.162) (0.554) 
High Service Score 1.130 1.862 0.305 
 (1.061) (1.190) (0.577) 
Wine Score 0.877*** 2.360*** 1.380*** 
 (0.162) (0.209) (0.110) 
By-the-Glass 6.051*** -1.049 -6.242*** 
 (1.188) (1.443) (0.705) 
N 1,382 1,382 1,382 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the restaurant level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 2: The effect of coverage through the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program on the health 
and academic performance of middle school children 
2.1 Introduction 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), established in 1997 as a joint federal-state 
program, aims to cover uninsured children in near-poor and moderate income families that do not 
meet the income and categorical eligibility requirements imposed by the Medicaid program. The 
benefits of providing low-cost health insurance to low-income children is of considerable policy 
interest, as evidenced by the subsequent expansion of CHIP eligibility (Rosenbach et al., 2007). 
This expansion increased the likelihood of coverage in CHIP, which may in have facilitated better 
access to medical care. Better access to care could have benefited children in various ways, for 
example, by raising their level of health and productivity, or liberating financial resources to fund 
education, which is a key determinant of human capital (Grossman, 1972). 
        The economics literature contains several recent studies that evaluate the long-run effects of 
Medicaid and CHIP eligibility on health, educational attainment, and labor market outcomes 
(Brown et al., 2015; Cohodes et al., 2016; Meyer and Wherry, 2016; Bourdreaux et al., 2016; 
Thompson, 2017). These papers conclude that expanded eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP results 
in more health service utilization, better health status and educational attainment, and higher wages 
in adulthood. However, the take-up rates of the public welfare programs, including CHIP, are 
typically well below 100% (Culter and Gruber, 1996; Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Dillender, 
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2017). Therefore, evaluation of the direct impacts of actual program coverage, rather than program 
eligibility, is important. There are few studies that have investigated the impacts of CHIP coverage 
on health and educational outcomes for middle school children,16 and none that we are aware of 
that use nationally representative data.17  
        Human capital accumulation in adulthood builds upon the school-age experience, and there 
is reason to believe that CHIP coverage during school-age helps narrow the gap in later life health 
and educational attainment of between children who grow up in the low and high income 
households (Case et al., 2002; Currie, 2009). In addition, local communities are more likely to 
provide routine health care to preschool-aged children without health insurance coverage than 
school-aged children (Slifkin et al., 2002), leaving more room for CHIP to better the condition of 
the school-aged children without coverage, and/or those covered by poor quality private plans.  
        Our paper contributes to the literature by providing the first causal estimates of the effects of 
the school-age CHIP coverage duration on health care utilization, health status, and academic 
performance for children in middle school. We analyze data from the nationally representative 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999 (ECLS-K, 1998). We limit 
the sample to children with household income between 100% and 300% of the federal poverty line 
(FPL) because this is the group of children targeted by CHIP (Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004). To 
address the endogeneity of coverage in CHIP, we use simulated eligibility as the instrument (Currie 
and Gruber, 1996a, 1996b; Cutler and Gruber, 1996), exploiting variation of CHIP income 
eligibility across states and over time. Results from our IV estimation indicate that the effects of 
                                                          
16 Thompson (2017) finds that childhood coverage of both Medicaid and CHIP leads to better adult health outcomes using NLSY-
79 data which surveyed children of age 14-21 as of 1979. Our study differs from Thompson (2017) by focusing on CHIP alone and 
evaluating childhood outcomes. 
17 Cullen et al. (2005) report the medium impact of duration of CHIP coverage on health care utilization and outcomes among 
children up to 3rd grade from reduced form estimates, using data from ECLS-K, 1998. Low power of the instrument they use in IV 
estimation due to the use of former waves of the ECLS-K, 1998 hampers causal inference. 
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CHIP coverage over a multi-year period on accessing consistent routine care and on having 
diagnosed with asthma are positive and statistically significant. However, we are unable to detect 
any effect of CHIP coverage on parent-evaluated child health status, obesity, and changes in 
academic test scores over time.  
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review the literature of CHIP benefits in 
Section 2. We describe the data in Section 3 and our empirical approach in Section 4. Section 5 
contains our empirical results. In Section 6, we discuss the results and conclude.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
States have the option to implement CHIP as an expansion to the current Medicaid program, as a 
separate program, or as a combined program.18 We are unaware of any paper that identifies 
differential impacts of separate CHIPs and Medicaid-extended CHIPs.19 Below we discuss the 
existing literature focusing on the effects of Medicaid and CHIP collectively.  
2.2.1 Coverage 
        A number of research studies have established the ways by which expansions in income 
eligibility result in a rise in coverage in Medicaid and CHIP, either through the gain of public 
insurance by the previously uninsured or through the movement of individuals from private plans 
to public insurance (crowd-out) (Cutler and Gruber, 1996; Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Seldon 
et al., 2004; Cullen et al., 2005; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Lee et al., 2008; Gruber and 
Simon, 2008). These papers consistently document a positive take-up rate under the expansions of 
                                                          
18 Separate CHIPs have a higher federal matching fund rate than ones that expand the current Medicaid program. In addition, a 
separate CHIP has more flexibility in designing its benefit, premium, cost sharing, and managed care. For example, the Early 
Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment Program is required under Medicaid, but not CHIP. 
19 For example, Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) find similar increases in the coverage from expansions in income eligibility from 
Medicaid based CHIP and from separate CHIP. 
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Medicaid and CHIP. However, evidence on the extent of the crowd-out effect is mixed, ranging 
from 0% to 60%.20 For example, Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) find no significant decline in 
private insurance coverage associated with Medicaid expansions. In contrast, Sasso and 
Buchmueller (2004) report a joint crowd-out rate of Medicaid and CHIP of just under 50%, which 
is in line with the estimated Medicaid crowd-out rate by Cutler and Gruber (1996). 
        Although the goal of CHIP expansions is to reduce the rate of uninsured children while 
limiting crowd-out,21 CHIP reaches near poor and moderate income households where over half 
of children are already covered by private insurance plans (Cullen et al., 2005). The previous 
literature focuses on families with household income between 100-200% of FPL in the 1990s (e.g., 
Cutler and Gruber, 1996). We provide additional evidence on the CHIP take-up and crowd-out 
rates among children with a higher income range of 100-300% of FPL following the CHIP 
expansion in the 2000s.22   
2.2 .2 Health Care Utilization 
There is a large body of literature that examines the effects of Medicaid and CHIP expansions in 
eligibility on health care utilization among low income children (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; 
Banthin and Seldon, 2003; Davidoff et al., 2005; Currie et al., 2008; Meyer and Wherry 2016; 
Bourdreaux et al., 2016; Thompson 2017). Most of these studies provide evidence that expansions 
in eligibility results in better access to health care, including routine medical care and dental care 
among eligible children. 23  The evidence of the effect of program coverage on health care 
                                                          
20 The upper limit of the range of crowd-out ratios is identified in Gruber and Simon (2008). 
21 Gruber and Simon (2008) find that anti-crowd-out measures, such as the frozen window of transition from private insurance to 
CHIP, generate counter effects by lowering take-up rates more than crowd-out rates. 
22 Most of the states cover children of household income up to 300% of the FPL under CHIP. One exception is New Jersey, which 
institutes the income eligibility of CHIP at 350% of the FPL during our study period.    
23 These studies use either IV or Difference-in-Difference (DID) to derive causal inference. While other studies identify positive 
effect of Medicaid/CHIP eligibility on access to health care, Banthin and Seldon (2003) shows no significant improvements in 
access of use of health services among CHIP eligible children. Neither there is no improvement in financial burden among CHIP 
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utilization is consistently positive (e.g., Fox et al., 2003; Dick et al., 2004;), though almost all are 
state-specific analysis.  
        One exception is Seldon and Hudson (2006), who use the 1996-2002 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS) data to study the nationwide effects of coverage through Medicaid and CHIP 
for children under the age of 18. Using Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation,24 they identify a 
positive effect of current coverage on current access to health care. However, these estimates do 
not reflect dynamics of health care utilization. Our analysis provides estimates of the duration of 
CHIP coverage on health care access across several years.  
2.2.3 Health Status and Educational Attainment 
The strand of literature that examines the impact of Medicaid and CHIP on health outcomes 
generates mixed evidence depending on the outcome measures analyzed (Currie and Gruber 
1996a, 1996b; Racine et al., 2001; Lykens and Jargowsky, 2002; Cullen et al., 2005; Dafny and 
Gruber, 2005; Currie et al., 2008; Levine and Schanzenbach, 2009; Howell et al., 2010; Cohodes 
et al., 2016; Meyer and Wherry; 2016; Thompson, 2017). For example, there is consistent evidence 
of reductions in child mortality associated with the Medicaid and CHIP expansions (Currie and 
Gruber 1996a, 1996b; Howell et al., 2010). Meyer and Wherry (2016) add that the reductions in 
child mortality due to CHIP are concentrated among the blacks. They find no evidence of CHIP 
reducing mortality among white children. In contrast, Racine et al. (2001) and Lykens and 
Jargowsky (2002) find no significant reductions in days of restricted activities among poor children 
during the early years of Medicaid and CHIP expansions. Similarly, both Dafny and Gruber (2005) 
                                                          
eligible households.  
24 Seldon and Hudson (2006) use two sets of instruments: 1). participation in Food Stamp Program and whether parents are 
covered by employment-based health insurance at the family level, 2). average penetration rates of Medicaid/CHIP at the state 
level. However, these instruments may be subject to policy endogeneity. 
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and Currie et al. (2005) find differential results by the different periods of Medicaid/CHIP 
expansions. 
        In contrast to previous works that examine the effects of Medicaid and CHIP eligibility, 
Thompson (2017) finds positive effects of Medicaid and CHIP coverage during the age of 0-18 on 
adult health outcomes in the long-run. Notably, this study considers adult outcomes, which are 
largely determined by the earlier years of human capital acquisition.  
        The literature focusing on educational attainment contains fewer studies. Levine and 
Schanzenbach (2009) link Medicaid and CHIP eligibility at birth to improvements in reading 
scores between 4th grade and 8th grade. Likewise, Cohodes et al. (2016) find that childhood 
Medicaid and CHIP eligibility increases the rates of high school and college completion among 
poor children. They also find that eligibility at birth as well as through school-age generates 
educational returns in early adulthood.  
        In contrast, Cullen et al. (2005) do not find statistically significant effects of CHIP coverage 
on test scores for elementary children. Extending their study period, we examine whether school-
age CHIP coverage over a multi-year period generates educational returns for middle school 
children. 
 
2.3 Empirical Approach 
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the causal effect of the duration of coverage in 
CHIP on health and education outcomes for middle-school children. Let i denote the individual, j 
denote school, and s denote state. If CHIP is randomly assigned, then an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression of a health or educational outcome on the duration of CHIP coverage (i.e. the 
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number of years enrolled in CHIP) will yield an unbiased estimate. The OLS regression 
specification is as follows: 
                                  𝐻𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ 𝐷𝐶𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝜎
′ ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠                                (2.1) 
where HEijs is the health or educational outcome, DCHIPijs is the duration of CHIP coverage, Xijs 
is a vector of control variables containing the individual, school, and state level characteristics, 
and εijs is the error term. In this case α1 is the effect of CHIP coverage duration on the outcomes.  
        However, the OLS estimate of α1 may be biased for several reasons. First, CHIP coverage 
could be negatively correlated with a child’s underlying health. For example, if a sick child is more 
likely to enroll in CHIP, then the coefficient of α1 would be downwardly biased. Second, the 
expansion of CHIP eligibility could be correlated with a state’s demographic composition. For 
instance, if states with healthier populations offer more generous health care plans to children, then 
children living in these states would achieve better outcomes even in the absence of CHIP. In that 
case, the OLS estimate would be upwardly biased. 
        In order to address the endogeneity of CHIP coverage due to individual selection and state 
demographics, we use simulated eligibility as an instrument, following Currie and Gruber (1996a, 
1996b) and Cutler and Gruber (1996). This IV approach accounts for not only selection at the 
individual level, but also accounts for the fact that a state’s demographic composition may be 
endogenous to CHIP income eligibility. By using a fixed sample to simulate CHIP eligibility, we 
exploit variation in CHIP rules across states and over time. Critically, we simulate the eligibility 
on a fixed sample to circumvent the confounding effects from unobservable individual traits and 
from demographic attributes that could be related to both CHIP coverage and outcomes. Although 
recent papers corroborate the credibility of using simulated eligibility as the instrument (e.g., 
Cohodes et al. 2016; Thompson, 2017; Dillender, 2017), we further reduce the potential policy 
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endogeneity by controlling for an extensive set of state-level variables related to children’s health 
and education, and further examine the validity of the simulated eligibility as instrument with a set 
of falsification tests.  
        We use the sample of children in their kindergarten year, as a fixed nationally representative 
cohort that does not vary across states or time. Next, we divide the fixed sample into mutually 
exclusive demographic cells by the children’s household size, race, gender, and age. For each year 
of the children’s school-age, we determine whether an individual child in a specific cell would be 
eligible for CHIP by comparing household income in the kindergarten year to the eligibility rule 
of each state and in that specific school-age year. We then calculate the proportion of eligible 
children for the cell as: 
                                  ⁡𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑖⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑎𝑙𝑙⁡𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑠
𝑛𝑐
𝑖=1               (2.2)        
where nc is the number of children in the specific cell. Holding the sample in each cell fixed, we 
calculate the proportion of eligible children in the cell for each specific state-year pair. For 
example, the simulated eligibility for the fixed cell of female children at age 6 in a white household 
with 3 family members in Pennsylvania in 2000 is 31% when we apply the CHIP eligibility rule 
in Pennsylvania in 2000; the simulated eligibility for the same cell in New Jersey in 2002 is 48% 
when we apply the CHIP eligibility rule in New Jersey in 2002. In this way, we obtain the 
simulated eligibility measure by the unique household size-race-gender-age cells across all sample 
states and years. Finally, since our regressor of interest is the duration of CHIP coverage, we 
construct the duration of simulated eligibility by summing the number of years of simulated 
eligibility. We use the simulated eligibility duration to instrument for the corresponding CHIP 
coverage duration of children in a certain demographic cell by their state of residence. 
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2.4 Data  
The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999 (ECLS-K), 
conducted by the National Center for Educational Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education, 
tracks school experiences of a nationally representative sample of roughly 22,000 kindergarteners 
(Institute of Education Sciences, 2009).25 The ECLS-K data collects detailed information on the 
children, their parents, and school administrators on the child’s entry to kindergarten, transition 
into primary school, and progression through 8th grade. Trained field agents surveyed children in 
schools and recorded their weight and height. Parents were interviewed on the phone, and school 
administrators provided information on children's direct and indirect academic performance. 
Identifiers for state of residence are contained in the restricted-use version of these data. For more 
information on the ECLS-K, see the User’s Manual (Tourangeau et al., 2009). 
        The information on health insurance varies across the waves. In the spring kindergarten 
survey (1999), parents were asked whether their child was covered by any insurance.26 In the 
following spring waves, parents were asked about the type of the insurance coverage,27 which 
includes private health insurance, Medicaid/CHIP, military health insurance, other public health 
insurance,28 and no insurance. Our sample includes children who participated in the spring 8th 
grade wave and had information on CHIP in all school-age spring waves: the spring of first grade 
(2000); the spring of third grade (2002); the spring of fifth grade (2004); and the spring of eight 
                                                          
25 The ECLS-K contains respondents in 41 out of 50 states. That excluded states are: Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
26 The health insurance question in the kindergarten wave includes private plans that only provide extra cash while an individual 
is hospitalized, which are not technically health insurance plans. 
27 The original health insurance status does not reconcile coverage among different insurance types. For example, a child’s health 
insurance status can be coded as having CHIP and private plans simultaneously. In some states, CHIP is outsourced to private 
insurance companies, and carries different names. We classify those reporting both CHIP and private coverage as being covered 
by CHIP. The share of the sample of those children is around 15%. We then use Hot-Deck Imputation, following the User’s Manual 
(Tourangeau et al., 2009) to fill in the missing values. Our imputed insurance status is in line with that in Cullen et al. (2005). 
28 We exclude the children covered by military insurance plans and other public insurance plans, which reduces the sample by 3%.  
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grade (2007).29 Because of the inability to identify CHIP coverage in the kindergarten spring wave, 
we do not use this wave. Our final sample size is 8,600 children and all models are estimated rely 
on cross-sectional data of individuals in the 8th grade wave.30 
        Information on health insurance status is collected at a point in time, so the specific time of 
the transition among different plans is unknown. Therefore, we take the midpoint of the interval 
between any two waves as the point of transition of insurance plans occurs when children switch 
insurance plans or enroll in coverage in between survey waves.31  
        We then limit our empirical analysis to the subset of children with household income within 
100-300% of FPL in the spring kindergarten (1999) because only children in near-poor to moderate 
income families were affected by the changes in CHIP income eligibility.32 This sample contains 
2,800 children. In addition, excluding children in families with household income below 100% of 
FPL mitigates the concern of the confounding effects of other welfare programs.33  
The ECLS-K contains several measures of health care utilization from the parent surveys. 
Previous work that assesses the effects of CHIP on access to health care, use whether a child has 
a usual source of medical care as a measure of access to health care (e.g., Slifkin et al., 2002; Dick 
et al., 2004). We create an indicator variable of consistent routine care that equals one if the child 
had routine doctor visits in all waves (i.e., never reported more than year between doctor visits for 
routine care between 1st grade and 8th grade), and equals zero otherwise. Similarly, we create an 
                                                          
29 In each spring wave, parents were interviewed between March and early July.  
30 Students who do not remain in school are randomly selected to be interviewed in subsequent years at a rate between 44% and 
50%. Cross-sectional and longitudinal weights ensure the sample of children in subsequent waves nationally representative. 
31 For example, if a parent reported that the child was covered by private insurance in the 3rd grade, but no insurance in the 5th 
grade, then we record the duration of private insurance coverage in this interval to be 1 year, or 12 months. In addition, the 
percentage of children who were enrolled in CHIP but opted out of CHIP in the following wave is below 3%.  
32 During our study period, the lowest CHIP income eligibility is 100% of FPL (e.g., Kansas and Delaware). Children in households 
with income below the poverty line qualify for Medicaid, and are not affected by the CHIP expansion. 
33 Food Stamp and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families are generally provided to children with household income below 100% 
of FPL during our study period. More than half of the states in our study period institute the income eligibility of CHIP at 200% of 
FPL.  
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indicator variable of consistent dental care use (i.e., never reported more than a year between dental 
visits between 1st grade and 8th grade). In addition to access to primary health care, we are 
interested in whether children covered in CHIP were more likely to be diagnosed with illnesses. 
We create an indicator variable of asthma diagnosis that equals one if the parent had ever been told 
that their child had asthma up to the 8th grade by physicians.34 Asthma, one of the most prevalent 
chronic conditions in children, has disproportionately adverse impacts on lower income children 
(Akinbami et al., 2009). Since asthma is not preventable but controllable, being diagnosed with 
asthma in childhood is indicative of better access to care rather than worsening health status. The 
ECLS-K also provides information on whether the child was diagnosed with sinusitis, hay fever, 
and diabetes. However, these illnesses are preventable. Being diagnosed with these diseases may 
be indicative of either better health care utilization or worsening health status. The prior is 
unknown.  
One health outcome measure is parent-evaluated child health status. A parent was asked to 
rate their child’s health on a scale from 1 to 5, indicating the child’s perceived health status (1 - 
excellent, 2 - very good, 3 - good, 4 - fair, 5 – poor). Along with this subjective measure of child 
health, we have two objective measures: BMI z-score, and an indicator for whether the child was 
obese (BMI >= 95% of the age-gender adjusted BMI distribution).35  We measure all health 
outcomes in the 8th grade since health is a stock variable. 
Following the value-added model of Kaestner and Grossman (2009), We use the change in 
the Item Response Theory (IRT) theta test scores for reading and math between 1st grade to 8th 
                                                          
34 The consistent routine care binary variable, consistent dental care binary variable, and the indicator of an ever diagnosis of 
asthma better match to the specification of CHIP coverage duration than the current access to health care, which is a flow variable.  
35 The BMI z-score and weight classification are based on the 2000 release of the CDC Growth Charts (U.S. D.H.H.S, 2002). 
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grade to measure the child’s increase in academic performance.36 The IRT theta scores were 
standardized separately to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one at all waves. A positive 
difference in the theta scores indicates an improvement in academic performance over time. 
Information on the respondent’s family, school, and neighborhood is available in the spring 
8th grade wave (2007), allowing us to control for individual and school characteristics. The control 
variables for household socio-demographic characteristics include birth weight, child age 
(continuous in months), grade, gender, race (white, black, hispanic, and other), population density 
of residence (urban, suburban, or rural), family income,37 family size, and the highest education 
level of the parents (8th grade or less, some high school but did not graduate, high school graduate, 
some college or 2- year degree, 4-year college graduate, more than 4-year college degree). The 
control variables for school characteristics include school type (a binary indicator for public 
school) and the percentage of students at the school eligible for a free or reduced price lunch. 
        In order to construct the simulated eligibility instrument, we obtain the CHIP income 
eligibility in all spring waves from a variety of resources.38 This information is contained in Table 
2.1. We construct the duration of simulated eligibility as described in Section 3.  
                                                          
36 The IRT theta scores are adjusted by the Errata Document provided by IES: 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012014_Errata.pdf.  
IRT scores have two advantages over the raw test scores: 1). IRT scores compensate for the possibility of a low-ability child guessing 
several difficult items correctly; 2). and make longitudinal measurement of gain in achievement over time possible, though the 
tests were not identically administered. The IRT scale scores, derived from the IRT theta score, are inappropriate to measure 
academic gain over time because of its different scales over time. However, the ECLS-K, 1998 does not provide information of how 
to rescale the IRT scale scores. 
37 Households were asked to report income to the nearest $1,000 income range. We create one measure of family income using 
the midpoint of the income ranges, a second measure using the upper limit of the income ranges, and a third measure using the 
lower limit of the income ranges. The empirical results are robust to the three measures. We report empirical results conditional 
on the midpoint measure for household income.  
38 Our source of CHIP income eligibility are Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service, Kaiser Family Foundation, Department of 
Social Services in Virginia, Department of Health in New York State, Department of Social Services in South Dakota, Department 
of Children & Family Services in Louisiana, and Riley et al. (1998). 
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        While the IV strategy may address the endogeneity problem of individual selection and 
demographics, this strategy assumes that states do not set CHIP eligibility limits based on average 
health status and educational outcomes. In order to address the potential issue of policy 
endogeneity, we control for state-level measures of social economic status and educational 
resources (SES), including real per capita income, the percentage of adults in the state with a 
bachelor’s degree of higher, the state percentage of overweight and obese girls and boys, the state 
percentage of overweight adults, the average public school pupil-to-teacher ratio, real total state 
tax revenue per student, and real state instructional expenditures per teacher. Per capita income 
and adult education were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau; the percentage of obese and 
overweight children we obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and the 
other state-level characteristics were obtained from the U.S. Department of Education. In addition, 
we control for the impact of other public welfare programs on educational and health outcomes 
through state-level measures of participation in the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), 
School Breakfast Program (SBP), and Summer Food Services Program (SFSP). 
        Figure 2.1 plots CHIP income eligibility for children above age 6 as of 2007, which is the 
year of the spring 8th grade wave of ECLS-K. In 2007, thirteen states instituted the CHIP 
maximum income eligibility above 200% of FPL, including high-income states, such as California, 
New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. Six states had eligibility levels below 200% of FPL. 
The remaining twenty-two states set their eligibility at 200% of FPL.  
        Table 2.2 lists the descriptive statistics for insurance status, CHIP eligibility, and outcome 
variables in all waves. While CHIP eligibility did not dramatically change over years, the share of 
children enrolled in CHIP steadily rose from 13% in 2000 to 20% in 2007. This suggests a 
“woodwork effect”, where the increase in CHIP coverage is concentrated among those previously 
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eligible for CHIP but not enrolled. Possible explanations include the lag in application 
simplifications and outreach efforts related to CHIP (Dubay and Kenney, 2009). The share of 
children covered by private insurance stayed relatively constant over the same period. As a result, 
the share of uninsured children fell gradually over time. 
Table 2.3 lists the descriptive statistics for all control variables at the individual level, school 
level, and state level.  
We apply the child cross-sectional weight in 8th grade to ensure the estimates are nationally 
representative and cluster the standard errors at the state level.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 The Effect of Simulated Eligibility on Coverage (1st Stage of IV) 
The coefficient of the instrument, simulated eligibility duration from the first stage of our IV model 
is reported in Table 2.4. The results indicate that simulated eligibility is a statistically significant 
predictor of an individual’s duration of CHIP coverage. Moreover, the F statistic associated with 
the instrument is 17.38, which is above the conventional threshold of 10 for sufficiently powerful 
continuous instruments (Stock et al., 2002).    
2.5.2 The Effect of CHIP Coverage Duration on Outcomes (2nd Stage of IV) 
Table 2.5 presents results for the second stage of the IV-Probit estimation for health care 
utilization, and results from Probit regressions, for the sake of comparison. The IV coefficients of 
the effects of CHIP coverage duration on consistent access to routine health care and asthma 
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diagnosis are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.39 However, the IV coefficient of 
consistent dental care is borderline statistically insignificant, though it carries the expected sign.  
The IV marginal effects imply that an additional year of CHIP coverage increases the 
likelihood of receiving consistent routine health care and an asthma diagnosis by 9.14 and 6.96 
percentage points, respectively. This is a 16 percent increase in the average probability of receiving 
consistent routine care and a 51 percent increase in the baseline asthma diagnosis.  
The IV effect of CHIP coverage duration on routine care is consistent with Howell and 
Kenney (2012), who report that one year of Medicaid/CHIP coverage increases the likelihood of 
receiving a usual source of medical care by 11.8 percentage points. Although the IV coefficient on 
dental care is insignificant, its magnitude, an annual 6.24 percentage point increase also falls within 
the interquartile range of the estimated impact of Medicaid/CHIP coverage on dental care (Howell 
and Kenney, 2012).40  
The Probit estimates of the impact of CHIP coverage duration on health care utilization are 
smaller, and are even negative for dental care. Contrasting these with the IV estimates suggests 
that there is a selection into CHIP by children with poorer baseline access to health care. 
We report results for the second stage of the IV estimation for health status and growth in test 
scores, along with results from OLS in Table 2.6. However, none of the IV coefficients on the 
CHIP coverage duration are statistically significant.  
The imprecisely estimated results for health status and education outcomes are consistent 
with findings by Cullen et al. (2005). One possible explanation is that children enrolled in CHIP 
                                                          
39 IV-linear probability model (IV-LPM) generate similar marginal effects as the IV-Probit model, and results of IV-LPM are available 
upon request. 
40 The interquartile interval of increases in dental care visits due to Medicaid and CHIP coverage ranges from a 4.5 percentage 
points to a 25 percentage points.  
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were in good health, leaving little room to improve. Another is that better health and education 
outcomes may materialize further in the future. 
In summary, the IV model finds that longer coverage in CHIP leads to better health care 
access for middle-school children, though the results for health status and academic performance 
are imprecisely estimated.  
2.5.3 Falsification Tests  
Even when we control for a series of observable state characteristics to avoid the potential policy 
endogeneity, there is possibility that the simulated eligibility duration could be positively 
correlated with unobserved trends in health at the state level. If children in states with better health 
care resources are covered by more generous CHIP plans, then the IV estimates would be upward 
biased. Another concern is that there may be other state-level policies, such as Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC), that are correlated with CHIP and also affect children’s health (Case et al., 2002; 
Currie, 2009). To investigate the validity of the instrument, we conduct two sets of falsification 
tests.  
First, we estimate our IV model on whether the child had access to routine medical care in 
the kindergarten year. This is not plausibly affected by the duration of CHIP coverage between 1st 
grade and 8th grade. Results of the probit and IV-probit regression of this binary variable are 
shown in Table 2.7. The IV coefficient of CHIP school-age duration is not statistically significant, 
implying that CHIP’s expansion is not related to the underlying trend in health care utilization. 
Second, since there is no formal way to test the validity of the instrument in a just-identified 
IV model, we follow the informal approach of Evans and Schwab (1995). Specifically, we include 
the instrument as a regressor in the Probit model to examine whether the instrument directly 
impacts the dependent variable, controlling for the independent variables. Again, we focus on the 
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outcomes of health care utilization, given that their IV estimates are statistically significant. The 
results of the informal test and the original Probit (i.e., without the instrument) are reported in 
Table 2.8. Neither the coefficient of the CHIP coverage duration varies across the two models, nor 
the coefficient of the instrument is statistically significant. This suggests no evidence against the 
exclusion criteria of the instrument.     
The results of these falsification tests should be interpreted with caution. A failure to reject 
the null hypothesis does not prove that the instrument is valid. Rather, the theoretical validity of 
the instrument is based on research indicating that states institute their own CHIP eligibility to 
increase public insurance coverage (Currie and Gruber, 1996a, 1996b; Cutler and Gruber, 1996). 
2.5.4 Robustness Check 
We take the midpoint of the interval between any two waves to measure the duration of CHIP 
coverage because the specific time of transition among plans is unobservable. We conduct a 
robustness test for whether our results for the health care utilization are driven by the unobservable 
timing of transition. 
 We create one measure of CHIP coverage duration between any two waves using the 
information on insurance in the leading wave only. For example, if a child was enrolled in CHIP 
in the 3rd grade, but not in the 5th grade, then we record the duration of CHIP coverage in this 
interval to be 2 years as opposed to 1 year in our main specification. Likewise, we create another 
measure of CHIP coverage duration between any two waves using the information on insurance 
in the trailing wave only.  
Results of these two measures of duration, along with the midpoint duration measure (i.e., the 
main specification) for health care utilization are reported in Table 2.9. All duration specifications 
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generate similar results, suggesting that the unobservable timing of transition among insurance 
plans does not affect our baseline results. 
2.5.5 Subgroup Analysis by Gender 
In this section, we investigate whether the effects of duration of CHIP coverage on health care 
utilization differ by gender. Both Probit and IV-Probit models are estimated separately for boys 
and girls, and the results are reported in Table 2.10. The first stage F statistics of the IV model for 
both boys and girls are of similar magnitudes but fall below 10 (F = 8.67 for boys and F = 7.66 for 
girls). 
The results of the IV model in Table 2.10 indicate that the effect of CHIP coverage on health 
care utilization is statistically significant at the 1% level across all measures for girls, but not for 
boys. In particular, the girls’ IV marginal effect for consistent dental care is statistically significant, 
implying that an additional year of CHIP coverage increases the likelihood of receiving consistent 
dental care by 9.10 percentage points, or a 12-percent increase in the baseline probability.41 
However, we need to interpret the insignificant result of consistent dental care by gender with 
a caveat because of the low power of the instrument. 
2.5.6 Crowd-Out 
To investigate the extent of crowd-out, we construct the duration of actual CHIP eligibility by 
applying CHIP eligibility rules to the actual sample of children in each wave. We IV regress the 
CHIP coverage duration on the actual eligibility duration, using simulated eligibility duration as 
the instrument and the same control variables as in the baseline specification. We re-run the IV 
estimation by substituting the dependent variable with the private insurance coverage duration.  
                                                          
41 The average rate of receiving consistent dental care for girls in the 8th grade is 0.754. 
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The results are reported in Table 2.11. The IV coefficients of the actual eligibility duration 
for both the CHIP coverage duration and the private insurance coverage duration are statistically 
significant. Taking the ratio of the absolute value of the latter IV coefficient over the former one, 
we obtain a crowd-out rate of 60%. Our crowd-out estimate reaches the upper bound of the crowd-
out rates provided by Gruber and Simon (2008). This is consistent with our higher income range 
of 100-300% of the FPL then is used some previous studies.42  
2.5.7 Effects of CHIP Coverage Duration Over Time 
Since we study the effects of CHIP coverage duration on health care utilization for middle-school 
children, it is reasonable to explore the effects of CHIP coverage duration for elementary-school 
children also. In particular, we focus on the IV estimates of 1st-5th grade CHIP coverage duration 
on health care utilization among 5th grade children because the instrument, the 1st-5th grade 
simulated eligibility duration is sufficiently powerful.43  
We report the effects of CHIP coverage duration for both elementary-school and middle-
school children in Table 2.12. As expected, the effects of CHIP coverage duration on consistent 
routine care and dental care are greater for elementary-school children than for middle-school 
children. However, the effect of CHIP coverage duration on asthma diagnosis for elementary-
school children is statistically insignificant and negative.  
   
                                                          
42 Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) focus on the child sample under the 300% of the FPL, including children covered by Medicaid. 
The child sample in our sample is of higher household income (i.e., 100%-300% of the FPL) which could qualify children for CHIP 
rather than Medicaid. As a result, our sample is of a higher rate of private insurance and a lower uninsured rate. Gruber and Simon 
(2008) finds a crowd-out rate of 58% among children in 100%-200% of FPL income households, and a crowd-out rate of 62% 
among children in 200%-300% of FPL income households. Their study period is 1996-2002.  
43 We apply the child cross-sectional weight in 5th grade in the model for 5th grade children to ensure the estimates are nationally 
representative. The dependent variables are modified to match the 1st-5th grade duration of CHIP coverage. The 1st-stage F 
statistic associate with the instrument, the simulated eligibility duration between 1st grade and 5ht grade is 27.12, greater than 
the conventional threshold of 10. In contrast, the 1st-stage F statistic of the instrument is 0.90 in the model for 3rd grade children, 
far more below 10. 
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Recent studies suggest that expansions in the income eligibility of Medicaid and CHIP leads to 
better health care utilization (Meyer and Wherry, 2016; Bourdreaux et al., 2016), which in turn 
improves health status (Thompson, 2017), educational attainment (Cohodes et al., 2016), and even 
pulls up wages in the labor market (Brown et al., 2015). While the estimated effects of the program 
eligibility, (the “intent to treat effects” (ITT)) are informative, what policymakers would better 
like to know are the effects of actual coverage, (i.e. the “treatment effects on the treated” (ToT)).44 
CHIP targets children in near poor and moderate income households that do not qualify for 
Medicaid. Although these households are not officially defined as poor, many face financial 
hardships in paying insurance premiums and medical bills. As a result, inadequate access to health 
care is not uncommon for such households. However, few studies have investigated how CHIP 
impacts the children in these households. Furthermore, we are not aware of any nationwide study 
that examines the effects of CHIP coverage in middle school, the stage where investments into 
child non-cognitive development generate the maximum human capital returns (Cunha et al., 
2006). Our study contributes to the current literature on CHIP by providing the first causal effects 
of the school-age duration of CHIP coverage on a comprehensive set of health and educational 
outcomes. 
We address endogenous individual selection and state demographic composition by using 
simulated eligibility duration as the instrument. The results of the IV model indicate that children 
enrolled in CHIP for a longer period of time are more likely to have a consistent source of routine 
care and their parents are more aware of whether they have asthma.  
                                                          
44 Since the take-up rate of CHIP is not complete, there is reason to believe that the magnitude of ToT is greater than that of ITT. 
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Routine care in childhood is believed to be cost effective (e.g., Trunz et al., 2006), reducing 
the total costs of medical care while improving health. The current framework of CHIP highlights 
the importance of routine child care. For example, Bright Futures, a national initiative for well 
children care under the age of 21, advocated by the American Academy of Pediatrics, has been 
integrated into the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment programs under CHIP 
programs that are Medicaid extensions.45   
        Although asthma is not curable, early diagnosis of asthma during school-age helps doctors 
advise a management plan for both parents and schools. This may increase children’s attendance 
because asthma is the leading chronic cause of absenteeism (Akinbami, 2006). However, because 
few parents provided information on whether their child received asthma treatment conditional on 
diagnosis, we are unable to link asthma treatment to school attendance.  
We find that while CHIP coverage significantly improves utilization of preventive care, we 
cannot identify an effect of CHIP coverage on health status and academic performance. This is not 
surprising given the mixed evidence of expanded CHIP eligibility on health and education.46 Since 
our measures of health and education are recorded in middle school, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that CHIP improves health and educational attainment in adulthood, as is reported by 
Currie et al. (2008) and Cohodes et al. (2016).  
One limitation of our analysis is that we lack a powerful instrument for private insurance 
coverage.47 Incorporating the duration of private coverage into our framework would shed light 
                                                          
45 The integration of the Bright Futures program into CHIP is not limited in Medicaid-based CHIP. For instance, the Wyoming 
department of health also integrates the Bright Futures into its separate CHIP.  
46 For example, Thompson (2017) finds that CHIP eligibility improves adult health, while finds limited evidence of improved 
access to health care and educational attainment.  
47 We tried the state mandate of employer-sponsored insurance plans and HMO penetration rates to instrument for the private 
coverage duration. Unfortunately, neither worked. 
49 
upon how CHIP affects uninsured children. Another limitation is that we do not have information 
on CHIP coverage before 2000 when CHIP experienced its initial expansion.48  
Despite these limitations, the findings in this paper have important policy implications. 
Although the Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes a maintenance of effort (MOE) provision for 
CHIP through September 2019, recent proposals have sought to end the federal MOE protection.49 
If the federal MOE is lifted, some states may cut back CHIP when they face budget constraints, 
shortening children’s CHIP coverage duration. For example, in the absence of the federal MOE, 
Arizona responded to a budget cut by freezing enrollment into its CHIP from January 2010 to May 
2012, resulting in a 1 percentage point increase in the uninsured rate among children, in contrast 
to a nationally declining trend. However, our research shows that CHIP coverage supported by 
eligibility expansion promotes consistent routine care in childhood that is crucial to healthy 
development.  
        Some may argue that cutting back CHIP would not make children worse off because the 
households could still enroll their children in private plans through the marketplace with tax 
subsidies. However, the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC) 
reports that this pathway is possible for less than half of the 5.3 million children currently enrolled 
in separate CHIP. Furthermore, children enrolled in the marketplace would face higher medical 
costs while receiving less comprehensive benefits than CHIP.  
                                                          
48 However, it is of a less concern given that the rates of CHIP coverage were lower than 10% during its initial two years, 1998 and 
1999 (Rosenbach et al., 2007). 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/Reports/downloads/rosenbach_2001_5.pdf 
49 The federal MOE protection mandates states to maintain their CHIP and keep the income eligibility as of 2010 in order to make 
no fewer children eligible for CHIP. The ACA maintenance of efforts (MOE) of CHIP income eligibility is in effect through the FY 
2019, although FY 2017 is the last year that federal funding is provided. The MOE institutes different requirements for Medicaid 
extended CHIP and separate CHIP.  
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Thus, our results offer some support for extending the current maintenance of CHIP 
eligibility, but guard against proposed Medicaid block grants as the uncertainty of the ACA grows. 
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1  State Income Eligibility for CHIP in 2007  
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Table 2.1a. Income Eligibility of State CHIP Plans (41 States) Age 1-5 
 
State Type  Max 1999 Max 2000 Max 2002 Max 2004 Max 2007 
Alabama Medicaid 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Alaska Medicaid 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 175%FPL 175%FPL 
Arizona Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
California Combined 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
Colorado Separate 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 
Connecticut Combined 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Delaware Separate 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Florida Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Georgia Separate 200%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 
Hawaii Medicaid 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Illinois Medicaid 150%FPL 150%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Indiana Medicaid 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Iowa Medicaid 185%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Kansas Separate 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Kentucky Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Louisiana Medicaid 150%FPL 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Maine Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Maryland Medicaid 200%FPL 200%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Massachusetts Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 300%FPL 
Michigan Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Minnesota Medicaid 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 
Mississippi Medicaid 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Missouri Medicaid 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Nebraska Medicaid 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
New Jersey Combined 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 
New Mexico Medicaid 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 
New York Separate 192%FPL 222%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
North Carolina Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Ohio Medicaid 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Oklahoma Medicaid 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Oregon Separate 170%FPL 170%FPL 170%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Pennsylvania Separate 200%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 300%FPL 
Rhode Island Medicaid 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
South Dakota Medicaid 140%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Tennessee Medicaid No Limit No Limit No Limit 133%FPL 133%FPL 
Texas Medicaid 133%FPL 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Utah Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Virginia Separate 150%FPL 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Washington Separate 200%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
Wisconsin Medicaid 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Wyoming Separate 133%FPL 133%FPL 133%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 
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Table 2.1b. Income Eligibility of State CHIP Plans (41 States) Age 6-16 
 
State Type Max 1999 Max 2000 Max 2002 Max 2004 Max 2007 
Alabama Medicaid 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Alaska Medicaid 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 175%FPL 175%FPL 
Arizona Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
California Combined 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
Colorado Separate 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 
Connecticut Combined 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Delaware Separate 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Florida Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Georgia Separate 200%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 
Hawaii Medicaid 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Illinois Medicaid 150%FPL 150%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Indiana Medicaid 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Iowa Medicaid 133%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Kansas Separate 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Kentucky Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Louisiana Medicaid 150%FPL 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Maine Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Maryland Medicaid 200%FPL 200%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Massachusetts Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 300%FPL 
Michigan Combined 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Minnesota Medicaid 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 275%FPL 
Mississippi Medicaid 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Missouri Medicaid 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 300%FPL 
Nebraska Medicaid 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
New Jersey Combined 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 350%FPL 
New Mexico Medicaid 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 
New York Separate 192%FPL 222%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
North Carolina Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Ohio Medicaid 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Oklahoma Medicaid 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Oregon Separate 170%FPL 170%FPL 170%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Pennsylvania Separate 200%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 235%FPL 300%FPL 
Rhode Island Medicaid 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
South Dakota Medicaid 140%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Tennessee Medicaid No Limit No Limit No Limit 100%FPL 133%FPL 
Texas Medicaid 100%FPL 100%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Utah Separate 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Virginia Separate 150%FPL 150%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 200%FPL 
Washington Separate 200%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 250%FPL 
Wisconsin Medicaid 100%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 185%FPL 
Wyoming Separate 100%FPL 133%FPL 133%FPL 185%FPL 200%FPL 
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics for Health Insurance and Outcome Variables 
 
 
Spring of 1st 
Grade 
Spring of 3rd 
Grade 
Spring of 5th 
Grade 
Spring of 8th 
Grade 
 VARIABLES 2000 2002 2004 2007 
Health Insurance and CHIP Eligibility 
Medicaid/CHIP 0.133 0.184 0.217 0.201 
 (0.340) (0.388) (0.412) (0.401) 
Private Insurance 0.775 0.749 0.728 0.742 
 (0.418) (0.434) (0.445) (0.438) 
No Insurance 0.092 0.067 0.055 0.057 
 (0.289) (0.250) (0.228) (0.231) 
Individual Eligibility 0.553 0.54 0.517 0.507 
 (0.497) (0.499) (0.500) (0.500) 
Simulated Eligibility 0.546 0.573 0.56 0.592 
  (0.262) (0.255) (0.250) (0.262) 
Duration of CHIP Enrollment 
in Years 
0.133 0.568 0.718 1.408 
 (0.340) (1.140) (1.321) (2.411) 
Duration of Simulated 
Eligibility in Years 
0.546 1.665 2.253 4.266 
 (0.262) (0.756) (0.954) (1.752) 
Health and Education  
Consistent Routine Care 0.833 0.702 0.616 0.558 
 (0.373) (0.457) (0.486) (0.497) 
Consistent Dental Care 0.876 0.818 0.774 0.737 
 (0.330) (0.386) (0.418) (0.440) 
Asthma Diagnosis --- 0.107 0.123 0.136 
 --- (0.309) (0.329) (0.343) 
Parent-Evaluated Health 1.631  1.647  1.731  1.639  
 (0.781) (0.792) (0.837) (0.766) 
BMI Z-Score 0.457  0.603  0.679  0.651  
 (1.060) (1.076) (1.101) (1.064) 
Obesity 0.146  0.198  0.234  0.195  
 (0.353) (0.398) (0.423) (0.396) 
Reading Theta Score 0.152  0.823  1.069  1.330  
 (0.406) (0.283) (0.270) (0.351) 
Math Theta Score 0.096  0.749  1.141  1.469  
 (0.385) (0.356) (0.372) (0.416) 
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 
Notes: The cells show the means for the variables in each row. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The survey 
wave is indicated by the column heading. We subsample to students whose parents provided valid health insurance 
information and all spring waves and reported household income between 100% through 300% of Federal Poverty 
Line in the Kindergarten Spring wave. Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 25 in order to comply with Department 
of Education non-disclosure requirements for ECLS-K, 1998. The descriptive statistics are based upon unweighted 
data.             
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Table 2.3a. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables at the Individual Level 
 
 
Spring of 1st 
Grade 
Spring of 3rd 
Grade 
Spring of 5th 
Grade 
Spring of 8th 
Grade 
 VARIABLES 2000 2002 2004 2007 
Individual Characteristics 
Age in Months 86.976  111.147  134.747  171.448  
 (4.416) (4.415) (4.435) (4.412) 
Family Incomes ($1,000s) 40.799  45.408  48.947  54.850  
 (21.456) (25.409) (30.295) (34.899) 
Family Size 4.622  4.632  4.595  4.507  
 (1.303) (1.292) (1.295) (1.285) 
Female 0.483  0.483  0.483  0.483  
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
Birth Weight (ounces) 94.547  94.547  94.547  94.547  
 (51.867) (51.867) (51.867) (51.867) 
White 0.652  0.652  0.652  0.652  
 (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) (0.476) 
Black 0.180  0.180  0.180  0.180  
 (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) (0.384) 
Hispanic 0.087  0.087  0.087  0.087  
 (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) 
Other Race 0.081  0.081  0.081  0.081  
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) (0.273) 
Parents' Highest Education 13.823  14.020  14.125  14.230  
 (2.195) (2.243) (2.258) (2.290) 
Urban 0.338  0.331  0.317  0.279  
 (0.473) (0.471) (0.466) (0.449) 
Suburban 0.340  0.335  0.321  0.323  
 (0.474) (0.472) (0.467) (0.468) 
Public School 0.813  0.823  0.831  0.857  
 (0.390) (0.382) (0.375) (0.350) 
Grade Level of Child 0.976  2.943  4.925  7.917  
 (0.159) (0.242) (0.274) (0.300) 
% of Students in Free or 
Reduced-Price Meals in School 
35.774  37.913  41.999  41.606  
 (23.253) (26.094) (21.748) (21.554) 
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.2.  
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Table 2.3b. Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables at the State Level 
 
 
Spring of 
1st Grade 
Spring of 
3rd Grade 
Spring of 
5th Grade 
Spring of 
8th Grade 
 VARIABLES 2000 2002 2004 2007 
State Characteristics    
Real Per Capita Income ($1,000s) 35.392  35.364  36.398  38.230  
 (4.253) (3.966) (4.067) (4.829) 
% of Overweight Male Children 34.367  34.366  34.366  34.008  
 (4.032) (4.036) (4.034) (4.048) 
% of Overweight Female Children 26.382  26.377  26.388  28.423  
 (4.070) (4.072) (4.074) (4.644) 
% of Overweight Adults 36.967  36.940  37.002  36.512  
 (1.225) (0.826) (1.106) (1.201) 
% of Obese Adults 20.721  22.222  23.164  26.612  
 (2.150) (2.553) (2.402) (2.636) 
% of Public School Pupil-to-Teacher  16.095  15.863  15.898  15.539  
 (2.287) (2.273) (2.579) (2.487) 
Real Total Tax Revenues per Student 
($1,000s) 
9.485  10.085  10.423  11.246  
 (1.508) (1.708) (1.905) (2.286) 
Real Instructional Expenditures per Teacher 
($1,000s) 
58.742  60.978  60.926  60.347  
 (9.921) (10.470) (10.523) (10.500) 
% of Adults with a Bachelor's Degree of 
Higher 
24.217  25.077  26.184  26.520  
 (3.739) (3.766) (3.817) (3.916) 
% of Students in the National School Lunch 
Program (NSLP) 
59.006  59.841  60.800  63.036  
 (11.342) (11.670) (11.806) (11.107) 
% of Students in the School Breakfast 
Program (SBP) 
15.384  16.573  17.708  19.916  
 (6.567) (6.789) (7.181) (6.897) 
% of Students in the Summer Food Services 
Program (SFSP) 
3.914  3.619  3.713  3.648  
 (2.369) (2.250) (2.715) (2.771) 
Observations 2,800 2,800 2,800 2,800 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
Table 2.4. First Stage: Relationship between Duration of CHIP Coverage and Duration of 
Simulated Eligibility 
 
VARIABLES Duration of CHIP Enrollment 1st-8th Grade 
Duration of Simulated CHIP Eligibility 1st-8th Grade 0.1750*** 
 (0.0419) 
F Statistic 17.38  
Observations 2,700 
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at the state level are in parentheses. The 
numbers of observations are rounded to the nearest 25 in order to comply with Department of Education non-disclosure 
requirements for ECLS-K, 1998. The F statistic corresponds to the hypothesis test that the coefficient for the duration 
of CHIP enrollment of CHIP eligibility, either simulated or individual, is equal to zero.  Additional variables included, 
but not shown, are: sex, age, grade, race/ethnicity (white, Hispanic, and other race, with black excluded), birth weight, 
population density (urban or suburban, with rural excluded), the type of school, the percentage of free and reduced-
price meals eligible students; family income, family size, parents’ highest education; real per capita income in the 
state, the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree in the state, the prevalence of childhood obesity among boys 
and girls in the state, the prevalence of adulthood overweight and obesity, the average pupil/teacher ratio in public 
schools in the state, real total state tax revenue per student in the state, real state instructional expenditures per student 
in the state, and the percentages of students in the state participating in the National School Lunch Program, School 
Breakfast Program, and Summer Food Services Program.                                       
Data: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten 1998, 8th grade wave (2007). 
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Table 2.5. Relationship between Duration of CHIP Coverage and Health Care Utilization 
 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Consistent Routine Care 0.0703*** 0.2739** 0.0261*** 0.0914*** 
 (0.0168) (0.1231) (0.0061) (0.0332) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0206 0.1977 -0.0066 0.0628 
 (0.0201) (0.1635) (0.0064) (0.0501) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0637*** 0.2984*** 0.0143*** 0.0696*** 
  (0.0202) (0.1073) (0.0048) (0.0259) 
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The excluded instrument is the duration of simulated CHIP eligibility 1st grade through 8th grade. We report 
the estimator and marginal effect of the duration of CHIP enrollment 1st grade through 8th grade. The sample size is 
2,700 for the estimation. Estimates from a linear probability model produce similar marginal effects and are available 
upon request. For additional notes, see Table 2.4.  
Data: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten 1998, 8th grade wave (2007). 
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Table 2.6. Relationship between Duration of CHIP Coverage and Health Status and Academic 
Performance 
 
 OLS/Probit IV OLS/Probit IV 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Panel A: Health Status   
Parent-Evaluated Health 0.0383*** 0.0303 0.0383*** 0.0303 
 (0.0122) (0.1052) (0.0122) (0.1052) 
BMI Z-Score -0.0125 -0.1113 -0.0125 -0.1113 
 (0.0147) (0.1032) (0.0147) (0.1032) 
Obesity -0.006 -0.0284 -0.0017 -0.0079 
  (0.0176) (0.1804) (0.0049) (0.0500) 
Panel B: Academic Performance  
Growth in Reading Theta Scores  0.0059 0.0357 0.0059 0.0357 
 (0.0064) (0.0470) (0.0064) (0.0470) 
Growth in Math Theta Scores  -0.0056 -0.001 -0.0056 -0.001 
  (0.0058) (0.0346) (0.0058) (0.0346) 
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Parent-Evaluated Health is arranged in a descending scale from 1 to 5. The higher ratings indicate the worse 
health status. The growth in test scores is measured by the difference of test scores between the 8th grade and 1st 
grade. 
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Table 2.7. Falsification Test: Relationship between Duration of CHIP Coverage and Implausibly 
Affected Outcome  
 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Routine Health Care in Kindergarten -0.0162 -0.0110 -0.0019 -0.0013 
  (0.0290) (0.2330) (0.0034) (0.0274) 
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.8. Falsification Test: Informal Test of Validity of the Simulated Eligibility 
 
  
Consistent Routine 
Care 
Consistent Dental 
Care Asthma Diagnosis 
VARIABLES Probit 
Informal 
Test Probit 
Informal 
Test Probit 
Informal 
Test 
Duration of CHIP Enrollment 
1st-8th Grade 0.0703*** 0.0677*** -0.0206 -0.0231 0.0637*** 0.0603*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0204) 
Duration of Simulated CHIP 
Eligibility 1st-8th Grade -- 0.0424 -- 0.0434 -- 0.0516 
 -- (0.0298) -- (0.0438) -- (0.0328) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: The informal test is actually an OLS regression of the dependent variable on both the duration of CHIP 
enrollment and the duration of simulated CHIP eligibility, controlling the same variables as the main model specified 
in the notes to Table 2.4.  
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Table 2.9. Robustness Checks: Specifications of Duration of CHIP Coverage 
 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Panel A: Leading Duration Measure   
Consistent Routine Care 0.0626*** 0.2685** 0.0233*** 0.0901*** 
 (0.0176) (0.1244) (0.0064) (0.0341) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0194 0.1883 -0.0062 0.0599 
 (0.0206) (0.1603) (0.0066) (0.0494) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0629*** 0.2783** 0.0142*** 0.0644** 
 (0.0206) (0.1178) (0.0049) (0.0280) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 17.05   
Observations 2,700     
Panel B: Trailing Duration Measure   
Consistent Routine Care 0.0721*** 0.2718** 0.0267*** 0.0900*** 
 (0.0154) (0.1213) (0.0056) (0.0319) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0197 0.2042 -0.0063 0.0646 
 (0.0189) (0.1622) (0.0061) (0.0492) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0595*** 0.3115*** 0.0134*** 0.0732*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0938) (0.0045) (0.0230) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 13.96   
Observations 2,700     
Panel C: Midpoint Duration Measure (Main Specification) 
Consistent Routine Care 0.0703*** 0.2739** 0.0261*** 0.0914*** 
 (0.0168) (0.1231) (0.0061) (0.0332) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0206 0.1977 -0.0066 0.0628 
 (0.0201) (0.1635) (0.0064) (0.0501) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0637*** 0.2984*** 0.0143*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0202) (0.1073) (0.0048) (0.0259) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 17.51   
Observations 2,700     
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.10. Subgroup Analysis: Relationship between Duration of CHIP Coverage and Health 
Care Utilization by Gender 
 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Panel A: Boys    
Consistent Routine Care 0.0672** 0.1726 0.0245** 0.0603 
 (0.0292) (0.2266) (0.0105) (0.0728) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0205 0.0022 -0.0064 0.0007 
 (0.0278) (0.3707) (0.0087) (0.1157) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0731*** 0.0753 0.0185*** 0.0191 
 (0.0245) (0.2647) (0.0064) (0.0660) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 8.67   
Observations 1,375     
Panel B: Girls    
Consistent Routine Care 0.0758*** 0.3723*** 0.0277*** 0.1145*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0852) (0.0079) (0.0180) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0195 0.2962*** -0.0061 0.0910*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0878) (0.0085) (0.0250) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0537** 0.3932*** 0.0096** 0.0905*** 
 (0.0254) (0.0479) (0.0047) (0.0142) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 7.66   
Observations 1,300     
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: See notes to Table 2.5. 
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Table 2.11. Relationship between Duration of Public and Private Insurance Coverage and 
Duration of Actual Eligibility 
 
VARIABLES 
Duration of CHP Enrollment 
1st-8th Grade 
Duration of Private Enrollment 
1st-8th Grade 
Duration of Actual CHIP Eligibility 1st-
8th Grade 
0.3258*** -0.1969** 
 (0.0861) (0.0899) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 155.27  
Observations 2,700  
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The excluded instrument is the duration of simulated CHIP eligibility 1st grade through 8th grade. See the 
notes to Table 2.4 for additional details of the IV regressions. 
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Table 2.12. Effects of CHIP Coverage Duration Over Time 
 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit 
VARIABLES Estimator Estimator Marg. Effect Marg. Effect 
Panel A: Duration of CHIP Enrollment 1st-5th Grade   
Consistent Routine Care 0.1102*** 0.5212*** 0.0384*** 0.1684*** 
 (0.0359) (0.1619) (0.0125) (0.0464) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0011 0.4534** -0.0003 0.1350** 
 (0.0451) (0.1783) (0.0134) (0.0541) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0656* -0.2703 0.0135* -0.0616 
 (0.0347) (0.2033) (0.0071) (0.0542) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 27.12   
Observations 2,700     
Panel B: Duration of CHIP Enrollment 1st-8th Grade (Main Specification) 
Consistent Routine Care 0.0703*** 0.2739** 0.0261*** 0.0914*** 
 (0.0168) (0.1231) (0.0061) (0.0332) 
Consistent Dental Care -0.0206 0.1977 -0.0066 0.0628 
 (0.0201) (0.1635) (0.0064) (0.0501) 
Asthma Diagnosis 0.0637*** 0.2984*** 0.0143*** 0.0696*** 
 (0.0202) (0.1073) (0.0048) (0.0259) 
1st Stage F-Statistic 17.51   
Observations 2,700     
Clustering standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Here is the explanation of the dependent variables in Panel A. The indicator variable of consistent routine care 
equals one if the child had routine doctor visits in spring 1st, 3rd, and 5th grade (i.e., never reported more than year 
between doctor visits for routine care between 1st grade and 5th grade), or equals zero otherwise. The indicator 
variable for consistent dental care follows the same rule. The indicator variable of asthma diagnosis that equals one if 
the child had ever been told to have asthma up to the 5th grade by physicians. See notes to Table 2.5 for additional 
details. 
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Chapter 3: The Effect of Participation in School 
Sports on Academic Achievement Among Middle 
School Children 
3.1 Introduction 
Communities in Manhattan, New York City (NYC) scrambled to finance school sponsored sports 
programs in 2011 after CHAMPS, a pilot program funded by the NYC Department of Education 
to promote physical activity, had its funding reduced.50 The cuts forced CHAMPS to supply only 
one coach per middle school, threatening the sustainability of sports programs at many 
participating schools. Likewise, in 2014 the state of Pennsylvania announced plans to cut more 
than $1 billion from the public education system, which led many Pennsylvania middle schools to 
suspend sports programs due to insufficient budgets.51 Despite their popularity, schools sports 
programs are often viewed as expendable when there are shortfalls in educational funding. 
        The economics literature contains numerous studies on the effect of participation in school 
sports, either in high school or in college, on educational attainment and labor market outcomes 
(Long and Caudill, 1991; Maloney and McCormick, 1993; Marsh, 1993; Anderson, 1998; Barron 
et al., 2000; Robust and Keil, 2000; Eide and Ronan, 2001; Libscomb, 2007; Lozano, 2008; Pfeifer 
and Cornelissen, 2010; Stevenson, 2010). These papers conclude that students who participate in 
school sports are less likely to drop out of high school, more likely to attend college, and are more 
                                                          
50 A DNAINFO New York (10/19/2011) article reports that CHAMPS Middle School Sports and Fitness League cuts funds to middle 
school sports. 
51 A FactCheck.Org article (06/27/2014) covers the quotes of Tom Wolf. 
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likely to earn higher wages than their peers who have not participated in sports. However, there 
are few studies that have investigated the academic return to participating in middle school sports, 
and none that we are aware of that use nationally representative data. 
        Human capital accumulation in high school and adulthood builds upon the middle school 
experience, and there is reason to believe that participation in middle school sports may have a 
positive impact on intellectual growth and development. Studies indicate that when children enter 
into the period of adolescence, investments in non-cognitive skills, self-concept,52 and discipline 
have a greater impact on long-run human capital accumulation than investments in cognitive skills 
(Cunha et al., 2006; Heckman et al., 2006; Pfeifer and Reuss, 2008). This is because children with 
better self-concept and discipline are more efficient at transforming investments in cognitive skills 
into learning skills. To the extent that socialization and training in sports improve self-concept and 
discipline, participation in school-sponsored sports may improve learning.  
        Our paper contributes to the literature on human capital accumulation by providing causal 
estimates of the effect of participation in school-sponsored sports on academic achievement for 
middle school children. We analyze data from the nationally representative Early Childhood 
Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999 (ECLS-K, 1998). To address the 
endogeneity of participation in school sports, we apply the method of instrumental variables (IV) 
to the value-added model of academic performance (Coleman et al., 1966). Results from our IV 
estimation indicate that the effect of participation in school sports on reading test scores is positive 
and statistically significant among children in middle school. We find evidence that sports 
participation is associated with lower levels of absenteeism from class. In addition, we find that 
                                                          
52 Baumeister (1999) provides a formal definition of self-concept in social psychology: “the individual’s belief about himself or 
herself, including the personal attributes and who and what the self is.”  
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the effect of school sports is positive and statistically significant among girls, while not sufficiently 
identified among boys.     
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we review the benefits of school sports in 
Section 2. Section 3 contains a description of our empirical approach. We describe the data in 
Section 4. Section 5 contains our empirical results. In Section 6, we conduct robustness checks of 
the validity of our instruments and a subgroup analysis by gender. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2 Benefits of School Sports 
Many papers consistently document positive correlations between school sports and educational 
attainment. For instance, Marsh (1993) finds a positive correlation between participation in high 
school sports and college attendance. Long and Caudill (1991) present evidence of a positive 
correlation between participation in sports at the college level and a higher rate of graduation. 
These positive correlations are likely mediated through three mechanisms: better academic self-
concept, discipline, and health. Figure 3.1 presents a conceptual model, constituting the likely 
channels through which involvement in school sports affects academic achievement.53 
3.2.1 Academic Self-Concept and Discipline 
A number of research studies establish the way that self-concept, which predicts success in the 
classroom and the labor market, is improved through school sports. Spady (1970, 1971) proposes 
that participation in sports increases students’ perception of social status, which not only enhances 
academic ambition and identification within the school, but also facilitates the formation of the 
                                                          
53 The channels are not exhaustive, but we consider those in Figure 3.1 the most important. There is a possibility that academic 
self-concept and discipline can be shaped during participation in other after school activities, such as dancing and music classes; 
however, our data does not contain information on children’s participation in other activities in middle school.    
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skills and attitudes that contribute to a student’s future success. Snyder and Spreitzer (1990) 
propose a role theory in which success in sports provides student athletes with incentives to do 
better in the classroom.  
        While a general measure of self-concept is used in most research studies, Marsh et al. (1988) 
and Marsh (1990) find that academic achievement is significantly correlated with academic self-
concept, but not with the general self-concept which encompasses non-academic attributes. 
        Beyond improvements in academic self-concept, Marks (1977) notes that school sports shape 
discipline in the classroom within the context of the “spend-and-drain” theory. He argues that 
participation in sports channels students’ abundant energy, making them feel more energetic when 
doing homework after training for athletic competition. In addition, expanding excess energy in 
sports stimulates students’ interest in school, leading to increased commitment to academic values. 
As a result, student athletes have lower rates of absenteeism from class than non-athletes.   
        Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) and Eren and Ozbeklik (2015) add that teamwork and 
leadership experience in school sports can also contribute to better academic self-concept and 
discipline.  
        Both improved academic self-concept and reduced absenteeism, could lead to an 
improvement in educational outcomes (Marsh, 1993; Spreitzer, 1994). Booth and Gerard (2011) 
provide the most recent evidence of these pathways by collecting data on students aged 11-12 at 
four schools in Cleveland. They find positive correlations between academic self-concept and 
absenteeism in the fall semester and test scores in reading, math, and science in the following 
spring semester. 
3.2.2 Health 
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Another possible channel through which participation in school sports can influence educational 
attainment is through its effect on health. Strong et al. (2005) find that more physical activity 
lowers the probabilities of obesity, cardiovascular disorders, and asthma among school-aged 
youth. Likewise, Cawley et al. (2013) report that more time spent in physical education (PE) 
classes reduces the probability of youth obesity, which is a contributor to many health problems 
in adolescence, such as prediabetes and bone and joint problems (US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2010). 
        However, current research produces mixed evidence on whether the health benefits of 
physical activity spill over to academic achievement. Strong et al. (2005) identify a moderate 
association between greater PE class time and gains in academic test scores. In contrast, Cawley 
et al. (2013) find more time spent in PE class does not affect academic test scores.  
 
3.3 Empirical Approach 
If participation in school sports was randomly assigned, one could identify the causal effect of 
sports participation on academic achievement using the following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression: 
                                               Score = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝜎
𝑇 ∙ 𝑋 + 𝜇 + 𝜀                              (3.1)  
where Score is a student’s test score on any one of a number of standardized tests; Sports is a 
binary indicator for whether the student participated in school-sponsored sports, X is a vector of 
demographic variables; µ is the student’s unobserved endowment of innate ability; and α1 is the 
causal effect of interest.   
        However, the decision to participate in school sports programs is not random. A selection 
bias may arise due to the fact that participation in school-sponsored sports is optional. For example, 
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if students of lower academic expectations disproportionately participate in school sports, α1 will 
have a downward bias.54 Alternatively, if children of higher socioeconomic status live in school 
districts that provide higher quality education and greater opportunities to participate in sports, α1 
will have an upward bias.  
        Only a few studies have attempted to account for this selection. Lipscomb (2006) uses fixed-
effect estimation to remove the influence of time-invariant confounding factors that affect both 
students’ propensity to participate in school sports and standardized test scores. However, fixed-
effect estimation is not feasible for cross-sectional data. Several studies use the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to correct for selection, which is consistent with both time-varying and 
time-invariant omitted factors. Stevenson (2010) uses the enactment of Title IX in 1972 as an 
instrument for variation in female athletic participation rates at the state level. She finds that a 
higher rate of sports participation generates higher rates of college attendance and employment 
among women. Barron et al. (2000) use the size of schools, library books per capita, and the 
faculty-to-student ratio as instruments. They find that participation in high school sports results in 
better educational attainment and higher wages. One limitation of this approach is that the use of 
school-level information to construct instruments may not account for unobservable attributes of 
schools that are correlated with higher levels of support for school sports.55  
                                                          
54 Maloney and McCormick (1993) compare the academic achievement of students participating in interscholastic sports with 
non-participating students by collecting data on all undergraduate students at Clemson University from 1985-1988. They find a 
positive correlation between low grade point average (GPA) and poor academic background, which is measured by SAT scores and 
rankings of high schools, among college athletes. In addition, they estimate that approximately 60% of the lower GPA for athletes 
competing in revenue-generating sports athletes is attributed to the poorer academic background, rather than time management 
in college. 
55  A similar strategy is exploited by Huang and Humphreys (2012) who use the county-level number of fitness and sports 
establishment to instrument for the individual probability of participation in physical activity and sports. However, they also 
control for county-level fixed effects to mitigate the concern over the unobservable county affluence affecting the number of 
sports establishment.  
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        Edie and Ronan (2001) find a positive effect of high school sports on educational attainment 
for most students (with the exception of white males) using IV estimation where height at the age 
of 16 is the instrument. Pfeifer and Cornelissen (2010) also use height as an instrument. They 
present evidence that participation in high school sports in Germany increases the probability of 
obtaining a secondary school or professional degree.  
       There are two requirements for using height as the instrument. First, height is a powerful 
predictor of school sports participation because children who are relatively tall at a young age have 
a competitive advantage in many sports, and are more likely to participate as a result (Cordovil et 
al., 2009).56  
        Second, the instruments must be conceptually valid in that they meet the exclusion restriction. 
This restriction implies that height cannot have a direct impact on academic achievement. 
However, previous studies have found a small positive correlation between body height and 
cognitive ability (Persico et al., 2004; Case and Paxson, 2008).57  
        We are concerned the issue that height could be positively correlated with the unobservable 
innate ability, invalidating the strategy of using height as the instrument (Rees and Sabia, 2010). 
Therefore, we consider a standard value-added model: 
                                                          
56 Of course, height is not an advantage in all sports, but the majority of middle school sports are those such as basketball and 
football for which being taller is good.  
57 Twin studies that attempt to disentangle the influence of environment and genetics on the correlation between height and 
cognitive skills generate mixed results. Using a large Finnish dataset of 8,798 twin pairs born before 1958 and both alive in 1974, 
Silventoinen et al. (2000) find that the relationship between height and ability is mostly mediated by environmental factors. When 
the models are estimated by gender, the small mediating effect of genetics disappears. However, the standard of living in Finland 
was lower than in western countries until the 1970s. Silventoinen et al. (2004) use a dataset of 5,454 twin pairs living in Minnesota 
in the 1980s to reexamine the degree to which genetic and environmental factors determine the correlation between body height 
and education. This study confirms the earlier findings of no genetically-based association between height and education in the 
United States. In contrast, Sundet et al. (2005) reports that genes explain 35% of the correlation between height and cognition 
among males using a data of approximately 2,600 Norwegian twins. Likewise, Silventoinen et al. (2006) find that height is 
positively correlated with cognition when genetics in origin interact with environments using a data of 1,094 Dutch twins. They 
suggest that height in early childhood (i.e. age 5-7) positively correlates with cognitive skills.   
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                               Score = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝜎
𝑇 ∙ 𝑋 + 𝜃 ∙ Lagged⁡Score + 𝜀                    (3.2) 
where the Lagged Score is used to capture the endowment of innate ability. We then derive the 
differenced specification of value-add model proposed by Kaestner and Grossman (2009) by 
assuming  = 1 in equation 2: 
                Score − Lagged⁡Score = Growth⁡in⁡Scores = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∙ 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝜎
𝑇 ∙ 𝑋 + 𝜀      (3.3) 
In this specification of the value-added model, the unobserved endowment of innate ability, µ is 
eliminated. In particular, the participation in school sports impacts the growth of test scores, rather 
than the test score, per se.  
        We use students’ lagged height and the growth in height as instruments, under the assumption 
that the variation in body height does not directly affect the growth in test scores (i.e., the same 
influences on test scores in a short period of time). In addition to accounting for selection into 
school sports, IV estimation has an additional benefit of correcting for classical measurement error 
(Bound et al., 2002). 
 
3.4 Data 
We use the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 1998-1999 (ECLS-K, 
1998) for our empirical analysis. These data, which are collected by the National Center for 
Educational Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education, track the school experience of a 
nationally representative sample of roughly 22,000 children entering kindergarten in the fall of 
1998 (Institute of Education Sciences, 2009).58 The ECLS-K, 1998 contains detailed information 
on children, parents, and school administrators at entry to kindergarten, transition into primary 
                                                          
58 The ECLS-K contains respondents in 41 out of 50 states. The excluded states are: Arkansas, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
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school, and progression through 8th grade. Trained field agents surveyed children in schools and 
measured their weight and height. Parents were interviewed on the phone, and school 
administrators provided information on children’s direct and indirect academic achievement 
(Tourangeau et al., 2009).  
        We limit our sample to middle-school children who were surveyed in the 2007 wave (i.e., the 
spring of 8th grade for most children) because the question for whether a child participated in 
school-sponsored sports was only asked in this wave.59 We create an indicator variable that equals 
one if the child participated in any school-sponsored sports, either varsity or intramural, in middle 
school, and equals zero otherwise. Our instrumental variables are the child’s height (in inches) in 
2000 and the growth in height between 2000 and 2007.60 We exclude 225 individuals with missing 
values on school sports participation and height in 2000 and 2007, which results in a final 
estimation sample of 9,200 students. Sample sizes across different models vary because some 
dependent variable values are not available for all observations. We apply the child cross-sectional 
weight in the 2007 wave to ensure that the estimates are nationally representative, and we cluster 
the standard errors at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) level. 
        The ECLS-K, 1998 contains a direct academic assessment instrument for reading, 
mathematics, and science. In each subject area, children receive a 10-item routing test in two 
stages. Performance on certain questions (routing items) in the first stage guided the selection and 
administration of one of two second-stage (high and low) forms in each subject. The second-stage 
                                                          
59 Nine percent of the students surveyed in the 2007 wave reported being in the 7th grade as opposed to the 8th grade. This is 
most likely because these children were held back sometime between 2000 and 2007. These students were asked the same 
question about their participation in school sports and took the same exams in reading, math, and science as students in 8th 
grade. Estimates of the sub-sample excluding students in the 7th grade are very similar to those using the full-sample. We use the 
full sample so that the estimates are nationally representative (Tourangeua et al., 2009). Although 3rd and 5th grade waves 
provided information on participation in sports, no further information was provided for whether these sports were school-based.    
60 We considered other measures of height as instruments, such as the height of the child in 2007, but this instrument set had the 
highest statistical power.  
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forms contained items of appropriate difficulty for the level of ability indicated by the routing 
items. We use change in the Item Response Theory (IRT) theta test scores from 5th grade to 8th 
grade to measure academic achievement.61 The IRT theta scores which normally distribute at all 
waves and range from -3 to 3, are better suited for measuring longitudinal growth than the IRT 
scale scores (Kieffer, 2011).62 
        In addition, information on the respondent’s family, school, neighborhood, and state of 
residence is available in the 2007 wave, allowing us to use an extensive set of control variables in 
our empirical model. The most important environmental variable in the control set is birth weight, 
which captures nutritional intake in utero, which affects both height and cognitive ability (e.g., 
Black et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2016). Other control variables for household socio-demographic 
characteristics include child age (continuous in months), grade, gender, race (White, Black, 
Hispanic, and other), population density of residence (urban, suburban, or rural), family income,63 
family size, and the highest education level of the parents (8th grade or less, some high school but 
did not graduate, high school graduate, some college or 2- year degree, 4-year college graduate, 
more than 4-year college degree). The control variables for school characteristics include a binary 
                                                          
61 The IRT theta scores are adjusted by the Errata Document provided by IES: 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012014_Errata.pdf. 
The IRT scores have two advantages over the raw scores: 1). Using IRT adjusts scores across children who received different 
second-stage forms, making longitudinal measurement of gain in academic achievement over time possible; 2). IRT scores 
compensate for the possibility that a low-ability child could guess the answers to several difficult questions correctly. 
62 Kieffer (2011) measures growth of reading ability using ECLS-K, 1998. He suggests that using IRT scale scores may misrepresent 
growth due to irrelevant factors, such as the number of test items selected for a given ability level at a given grade. In addition, 
one would need to rescale the IRT scale scores across waves to measure children’s academic development. However, the nonlinear 
rescale algorithm is unknown to researchers. Therefore, the IRT theta scores better represent the developmental growth, 
corroborated by the ECLS-K user’s manual (Tourangeau et al., 2009).  
63 Households were asked to report income to the nearest $1,000 income range. We create one measure of family income using 
the midpoint of the income ranges, a second measure using the upper limit of the income ranges, and a third measure using the 
lower limit of the income ranges. The empirical results are robust to the three measures. We report empirical results conditional 
on the midpoint measure for household income.  
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indicator for public school and the percentage of students at the school eligible for a free or reduced 
price lunch. 
        In the 2007 wave, two teachers (reading and math/science) were asked to rate the student’s 
level of absenteeism from class (i.e., “How often is this student absent from your class?”). The 
options were: 1 - never, 2 - rarely, 3 - some of the time, 4 - most of the time, 5 - all of the time. 
We take the average of the response scores for the student’s absenteeism from the two teachers as 
a proxy for the student’s academic discipline.64  
        The ECLS-K, 1998 measures each child’s self-concept through a Self-Description 
Questionnaire (SDQ) administered in middle school. Questions in the SDQ are used to measure 
the extent to which the child internalized his or her problems. Through these questions children 
were asked how they felt about their academic achievement, including their competence in 
classroom learning, doing homework, and taking tests. A scale score was calculated as the mean 
of the scores of the individual items measuring the student’s feelings towards his or her academic 
achievement. This scale score was then rounded to the nearest integer to create the variable SDQ 
problem internalization. The final measure of SDQ problem internalization variable is ordinal, 
ranging from 1 to 4 in descending order (1 – strongly agree with the presence of the internalizing 
problem, 2 – agree, 3 – disagree, 4 – strongly disagree).  
        The ECLS-K, 1998 also provides measures of children’s health status. A parent was asked to 
rate their child’s health on a scale from 1 to 5, indicating health status (1 - excellent, 2 - very good, 
3 - good, 4 - fair, 5 – poor).  
        Table 3.1 contains summary statistics for the ECLS-K variables, including variables used to 
explore the mechanisms through which participation in school sports impacts academic 
                                                          
64 Both teachers gave similar ratings on absenteeism in most cases. 
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achievement, in our empirical models. The participation rate in school sports among middle-school 
students is 61.1%, highlighting the importance of evaluating the middle school sports programs. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Power and Validity of Instruments 
The coefficients of the instruments from the first stage of our IV model are reported in Table 3.2. 
The OLS results indicate that both instruments are statistically significant predictors of an 
individual’s enrollment in school sports. The point estimates of the coefficients on the instruments 
indicate that being one inch taller in 2000 increases the probability of participating in school sports 
in middle school by 0.8 percentage points; and growing one inch between 2000 and 2007 translates 
into an increase in the probability of enrolling in school sports in middle school of 1.3 percentage 
points. Moreover, the F statistic associated with the instrument set is 11.6, which is above the 
conventional threshold of 10 for sufficiently powerful continuous instruments (Stock et al., 2002).  
        Since our IV model is over-identified, we can perform an over-identification test for the 
validity of the instruments. Hansen’s J test examines whether the expected value of the cross 
product of unobservable errors and functions of observable variables are orthogonal (Hansen, 
1982). The null hypothesis is that both instruments, height in 2000, and the growth height between 
2000 and 2007, are valid.65 The chi-square statistics and p-values obtained from the test where the 
IRT test scores are the dependent variables are shown in Table 3.3. In all cases, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.66  
                                                          
65 It is also possible that rejection of the null hypothesis is due to the incorrectly specified conditional moments. 
66 Rees and Sabia (2010) test the validity of height as an IV for sports participation in the Add Health data by regressing residuals 
from OLS models of academic outcomes (GPA, aspiration to attend college, difficulty in paying attention in class, and difficulty in 
completing homework) on height and, likewise, find no correlation between height and the residuals.   
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        We rely on the value-added model to difference out the endowment of innate ability. We are 
concerned that the innate ability could be time varying, invalidating the instruments. We test this 
possibility by considering fixed-effect regressions of test scores on height, controlling the student’s 
physical activity and the same variables as the baseline model. We use physical activity level as a 
control variable in this test because it is available in all waves. We create a categorical variable for 
a student’s days of PE class per week reported by teachers (1 - never, 2 – less than once, 3 – 1 or 
2 times, 4 – 3 or 4 times, 5 – every day) to measure the student’s physical activity. A statistically 
significant coefficient of height would indicate that height has a direct effect on the growth in test 
scores. Results of the fixed-effect regressions between any two waves are reported in Table 3.4. 
The coefficient of height is not statistically significant across any two waves, providing no 
evidence against the value-added specification.  
        However, these results should be interpreted with caution. A failure to reject the null 
hypothesis does not prove that the instruments are valid. Rather, the theoretical validity of the 
instruments is based on the value-added model where the lagged score captures the endowment of 
innate ability (Rees and Sabia, 2010). Then, even height could impact test scores differently in 
early childhood, such a situation is a less concern in our study, however, since the growth in test 
scores is measured in late childhood (Silventoinen et al., 2006).67 
3.5.2 The Impact of School Sports on Academic Achievement 
Table 3.5 presents estimation results for both the OLS and the IV models of the impact of sports 
participation on academic achievement. The IV coefficient of the effect of participation in school 
sports on growth in IRT theta scores in reading from the 5th grade to the 8th grade is positive and 
                                                          
67 Using Dutch twin data, Silventoinen et al. (2006) report no association between height and cognitive skills in late childhood (i.e., 
age 10-12), while a positive correlation between height and cognitive skills in early childhood (i.e., age 5-7).  
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statistically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, IV coefficients for the growth in math and 
science scores are not statistically significant. The point estimate implies that participation in 
school sports in middle school improves the reading IRT theta score by 0.27 standard deviations. 
The OLS estimate of the impact of school sports participation in the growth in reading scores is 
small and negatively estimated. Contrasting this with the IV estimate suggests that there is 
selection into score sports by students with lower baseline reading ability. The IV result is smaller 
than those of Edie and Ronan (2001) who find that participation in high school sports increases 
the likelihood of attending and graduating from college on the order of 20%-50%, without 
controlling for children’s latent ability.68 This result differs from Rees and Sabia (2010) who find 
no impact of high sports participation on GPA in math and English. This discrepancy may be 
because they do not differentiate school-based sports from other sports programs, or because they 
use a different measure of academic achievement.69  
        Our results suggest that participation in school sports has a statistically significant impact on 
the growth of reading scores but no impact on the growth of mathematics and science scores. This 
is consistent with evidence from White and McTeer (1990) who find that the academic gain from 
sports participation is more pronounced in subjects where cultural context is more important (such 
as reading) than in objective subjects (such as math).  
3.5.3 Mechanisms 
We investigate the plausible mechanisms generating the academic benefits of playing school 
sports, as described in Figure 3.1. We measure health status using parent evaluated health; we 
                                                          
68  Edie and Ronan (2001) present empirical results by gender and race. We average their separate IV estimates using the 
proportions of their sample falling into each racial category in order to derive these estimates for boys and girls.  
69 Rees and Sabia (2010) use children’s scores on the Adolescent Health Picture Vocabulary Test to proxy for lagged GPA in math 
and English in the value-added model.  
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measure academic discipline using absenteeism from class; and we measure academic self-concept 
using the SDQ problem internalization instrument that gauges the extent to which children 
internalize their academic problems.  
        Table 3.6 displays OLS and IV estimates of the impact of school sports participation on these 
outcomes. We conduct over-identification tests for each model. The model with parent evaluated 
health as the outcome fails the test, while the models with absenteeism and SDQ problem 
internalization pass. As a result, we focus on the OLS estimate for parent’s evaluated health, which 
is qualitatively similar to the IV estimates, but the IV estimates for absenteeism from class and 
SDQ problem internalization. The OLS estimate, presented in Panel A of Table 3.6, suggests that 
participation in school sports is positively correlated with better parent-evaluated health status. 
Consistent with earlier findings that participation in school sports shapes discipline and improves 
academic self-concept (Marks, 1977; Snyder and Spreitzer, 1990), the IV estimates indicate that 
participation in school sports leads to lower rates of absenteeism from class and better ratings on 
SDQ problem internalization.  
        In order to investigate the next link in the pathway between sports participation and academic 
achievement, we estimate the impact of parent evaluated health, absenteeism from class, and SDQ 
problem internalization on the growth in test scores. In this case we present only OLS results 
because we do not have instruments for these mechanism variables. As a result, the estimates 
represent associations rather than causal effects because academic outcomes, self-concept, and 
discipline may be simultaneously determined.70 Our OLS results in Table 3.7 indicate that reduced 
                                                          
70 In accordance with symbolic interactionism, Marsh et al. (1993) validate the bilaterally positive association between academic 
self-concept and academic achievement. On the one hand, higher academic self-concept enhances initiative and facilitates 
persistence after failure, improving academic achievement. On the other hand, better academic records alleviate depression and 
worries about school performance.  
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absenteeism is positively and significantly correlated with the growth in IRT theta scores across 
all subjects. In contrast, the effects of parent evaluated health status and SDQ problem 
internalization on test scores are small and not statistically significant. The above results suggest 
that participation in school sports improves test scores through higher rates of school attendance, 
but not necessarily through better health and better academic self-concept.   
 
3.6 Robustness Checks 
3.6.1 Parental Investment 
Positive associations between children’s educational attainment and parental human capital 
investments have been identified in a large number of empirical studies. Keane and Wolpin (2001) 
find that parental subsidies (e.g., monetary transfers) are the most effective household intervention 
to encourage young adults at the age of 16 to pursue a postsecondary education. It is possible that 
children who participate in school sports may receive greater parental investments than those who 
do not. This could threaten our identification strategy if student athletes benefit from greater 
parental investments that result in higher test scores. To investigate this possibility, we consider 
two potential measures of parental investments: whether the child was covered by health insurance, 
and whether the child had access to routine medical care within the past year. Results of the probit 
and IV-probit regression of these binary variables on participation in school sports are shown in 
Table 3.8. Neither of the IV coefficients of participation in school sports is statistically significant, 
implying that student athletes do not receive more parental investments, as defined by these 
measures, than do non-athletes. 
3.6.2 Discrimination at School 
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It is also possible that taller children are treated more favorably by teachers and classmates than 
shorter children in ways that build better self-concept (Persico et al., 2004). The hypothesis of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy predicts that biased teacher expectations against shorter students ultimately 
lower their standardized test scores (Jussim, 1991). Likewise, Wentzel (1998) shows that peer 
support is a positive predictor of students’ interest in learning and academic achievement. 
Therefore, we examine whether favoritism by teachers and classmates at school is related to 
students’ body height. A correlation between height and favoritism would pose a threat to the 
validity of our instruments because it would imply that height directly improves academic 
achievement. 
        Children were asked about whether they felt close to their teachers and classmates (1 – never, 
2 – sometimes, 3 – often, 4 - always). We use the degree of closeness to proxy for favoritism at 
school. We report the results of an OLS regression of these categorical variables on 1st grade 
height and the growth in height in Table 3.9. None of the OLS coefficients of height in 2000 and 
the growth in height between 2000 and 2007 is statistically significant in the two OLS models, and 
the F tests for the joint significance of the variables cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect 
of height on the outcomes. These results are not consistent with favoritism towards taller students 
by their teachers and peers. 
3.6.3 Childhood Nutrition and General Self-Concept 
One limitation of our data and modeling approach is that we cannot measure the nutritional intake 
of children throughout their lives, which may impact educational attainment (Strauss and Thomas, 
1998). Although disparities in educational outcomes are more likely to be attributed to differences 
in childhood nutrition in developing countries (e.g., Haddad and Bouis, 1991; Steckel, 1995), we 
attempt to determine whether differences in nutritional intake impact our results. We do this by 
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estimating a model with an additional control for the nutritional intake of children before middle 
school. Starting from the 2004 wave (i.e., the spring 5th grade wave) of the ECLS-K, a parent was 
asked to provide information on the child’s vegetable consumption. We create a binary variable 
for whether the child ate any vegetables other than green salad, potatoes, and carrots on a weekly 
basis.  
        Another concern is that taller children may have better self-concept independent of school 
sports and that this improved self-concept due to height improves test scores (Libscomb, 2007). If 
this is the case it would violate the IV exclusion restriction. A set of general self-conception (i.e., 
a collection of beliefs about oneself) questions, adapted from the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg. 1965) are available in the SDQ. 71  These questions asked about the student’s 
perceptions of usefulness, confidence, and pride, independent of academic achievement. 
Responses to the three questions were standardized separately to a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. The scale score of the general self-concept is the average of the three standardized 
scores. A higher score indicates better general self-concept.  
        Table 3.10 contains the estimates from models that include measures of childhood nutrition 
and general self-concept. In the IV equation with the additional control for childhood nutrition 
(Panel A), the estimated coefficients on participation in school sports are very similar to those of 
our original specification (Panel C) Likewise, including a control for general self-concept in the 
IV model does not change the coefficient on school sports. This suggests that the academic 
premium enjoyed by taller students is mediated through participation in school sports. Overall 
these robustness checks support of the validity of our instruments.  
 
                                                          
71 Note that this is a different measure than the one we use for academic self-concept.  
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3.6.4 Subgroup Analysis: Difference by Gender  
In this section, we investigate whether the effect of participation in school sports on academic 
achievement differs by gender.72 Both OLS and IV models are estimated separately for boys and 
girls, and the results are reported in Table 3.11. The first stage F statistic of the IV model for girls 
is much greater than for boys (F = 29 for girls versus F = 2.7 for boys), suggesting that body height 
is a powerful predictor of participation in school sports for girls, but not for boys.  
        The results of the IV model in Table 3.11 indicate that participation in school sports increases 
the reading scores by 0.15 standard deviations for girls, but there is a statistically insignificant 
impact for math score and science scores. We also find that participation in school-sponsored 
sports results in reductions in absenteeism for girls (results available from the authors upon 
request). However, we need to interpret the result for boys with the caveat that the IV model is not 
sufficiently identified. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possible benefits of participation in school 
sports for boys.  
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The prior literature on school sports focuses primarily on the effect of participation in high school 
sports on educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Past research suggests that academic 
gains from high-school sports are mediated through increases in the individual’s discipline and 
academic self-concept. However, we are not aware of any nationally representative studies that 
investigate the academic returns from participation in middle-school sports. To fill this gap in the 
                                                          
72 The Table of Summary Statistics by Gender will be available upon request. There are only small differences in test scores, 
participation rates in school sports, and body height and growth on average between boys and girls. For example, the participation 
rate in school sports is 63% for boys and 59% for girls. 
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literature, this paper estimates the effect of participation in school sports on academic achievement 
for children in middle school, using the ECLS-K, 1998. Our analysis is unique among current 
research on the academic returns to school-sponsored sports for three reasons. 
          First, we provide the first causal estimates of the academic benefits from playing school 
sports for children in middle school. We apply IV estimation to value-added specification to 
correct for endogenous enrollment in school sports due to adverse selection and unobservable 
environment, using lagged body height and the growth in height as instruments. The results of the 
IV model indicate that participation in school sports significantly improves the IRT theta scores in 
reading, but not math and science, for middle-school children. 
        Second, we explore plausible mechanisms through which sports participation affects 
academic achievement. We find that the academic return to participation is mediated through better 
academic discipline. 
        Finally, we find evidence that the beneficial effect of school sports is significant for girls, but 
sufficiently identified for boys.  
        One limitation of our analysis is that we lack information on the length of a child’s 
involvement in school sports in the ECLS-K, 1998. Incorporating the dynamics of participation 
into the model would shed light upon the optimal duration of involvement in school sports. 
Another limitation is that we cannot identify different types of programs in middle school, such as 
intramural sports versus interscholastic sports.  
        Despite these limitations, the findings in this paper are potentially useful to school 
administrators. Middle schools in the public education system are subject to federal funding rules 
instituted under the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).73 Schools that do not meet the NCLB 
                                                          
73 Eight three percent of middle schools nationwide are public, according to Table 3.1.  
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requirements for adequate progress in reading and math face fines and sanctions. After the NCLB 
Act, some schools were compelled to cut funding for physical education and sports to support extra 
instruction in reading and math (Center on Education Policy, 2006). However, our research shows 
that cutting funding for sports could be counter-productive. 
        This paper has other important policy implications. Students generally start participating in 
school-based sports in middle school because most elementary schools do not offer such programs. 
According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO, 2012), opportunities for middle-
school students to participate in school sports increased from 2000 through 2006. Nonetheless, 
budget constraints remain the foremost barrier to middle schools seeking to expand school-based 
programs to allow broader participation.74 When local governments face financial difficulties 
middle schools struggle to maintain school-based sports programs. Some school districts have even 
instituted “pay-to-play” arrangements, which charge students a participation fee for school sports 
activities, disadvantaging students from low-income households. In view of the local government’s 
role in promoting children’s outcomes in education and closing the gap in long-run human capital 
accumulation between children of low and high socioeconomic status, policymakers should 
encourage initiatives that expand access for children to participate in sports within the school 
context.75 
 
 
 
                                                          
74 The GAO 2012 report cites that purchasing equipment, paying coaches, and subsidizing students’ traveling for interscholastic 
sports are the top 3 financial concerns.  
75 For example, the Mayor’s After-School Achievement Program (ASAP) is designed to expand opportunities to sports after school 
for Houston youth. Through ASAP, the city of Houston funds school agencies to provide after-school programs for middle school 
youth. ASAP is active during the school year.  
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3.8 Tables and Figures 
Figure 3.1  Conceptual Model of Mechanisms 
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Main Estimation in Middle School 
 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. 
School Sports and Height     
Participation in School Sports 0.610 0.488 
Height in 2000 (inches) 48.446 2.397 
Growth in Height between 2000 and 2007 (inches) 15.982 2.246 
Academic Achievement   
Reading Theta Score  0.288 1.001 
Math Theta Score  0.314 1.012 
Science Theta Score  0.172 0.964 
Student Characteristics   
Age in Months 171.393 4.519 
Female 0.497 0.500 
8th Grade Child 0.898 0.303 
White 0.615 0.487 
Hispanic 0.173 0.379 
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.108 0.311 
Birth Weight (ounces) 91.248 53.545 
School Characteristics   
Public School 0.830 0.376 
% of Students in Free/Reduced-Price Meals in School 41.479 24.162 
Household Characteristics   
Family Incomes ($1,000s) 76.041 59.864 
Family Size 4.491 1.298 
Parents' Highest Education 13.290 5.084 
Urban 0.298 0.457 
Suburban 0.361 0.480 
Family Rule on Homework 0.938 0.241 
Academic Discipline and Self-Concept, and Health   
Absenteeism from Class (1-5)  2.093 0.516 
SDQ Problem Internalization (1-4) 2.037 0.545 
Parent-Evaluated Health (1-5) 1.614 0.774 
Observations 9,200 9,200 
Notes: Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 50 and sample means are based upon unweighted data in order to 
comply with Department of Education non-disclosure requirements for ECLS-K, 1998. Responses to Absenteeism 
from Class questions are averaged over the reading teacher’s rating and the math/science teacher’s rating (ECLS-K, 
1998: User’s Manual, Tourangeua et al., 2009). Scores of Absenteeism from Class are ordered from 1 (never absent) 
to 5 (absent all of the time). Scores of SDQ Problem Internalization are ordered from 1 (not true at all) to 4 (very true). 
Scores of Parent-Evaluated Health are ordered from 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor). 
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Table 3.2. First Stage: Relationship between Height and School Sports Participation 
 
VARIABLES Participation in School Sports 
Growth in Height between 2000 and 2007  0.013*** 
 (0.004) 
Height in 2000  0.008* 
 (0.004) 
F-Statistic 11.560 
Observations 7,500 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Notes:  The ECLS-K, 1998 employed a 3-stage probability sample design to select a nationally representative sample 
of children attending kindergarten in 1998–99. In the first-stage the primary sampling units (PSUs) were geographic 
areas consisting of counties or groups of counties. The second-stage units were schools within sampled PSUs. The 
third- and final-stage units were children within schools (ECLS-K, 1998: User’s Manual, Tourangeua et al., 2009). 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering within PSU are in parentheses. Cross-sectional 
weights in 8th grade are used to adjust for disproportionate sampling and survey nonresponse. The numbers of 
observations are rounded to the nearest 50 to comply with non-disclosure requirements for ECLS-K, 1998. 
Additional variables included, but not shown, are: sex, age, grade, race/ethnicity (white, Hispanic, and other race, with 
black excluded), birth weight, population density (urban or suburban, with rural excluded), the type of school, the 
percentage of free and reduced-price meals eligible students; family income, family size, parents’ highest education; 
real per capita income in the state, the percentage of adults with a bachelor’s degree in the state, the average 
pupil/teacher ratio in public schools in the state, real total state tax revenue per student in the state, and real state 
instructional expenditures per student in the state. 
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Table 3.3. Over-Identification Tests: Hansen’s J Test 
 
VARIABLES 
Reading 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Math 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Science 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Chi2 (1) 1.644 0.011 0.542 
P-Value 0.200 0.917 0.462 
Observations 7,200 7,250 7,250 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Notes: We perform Hansen’s J Tests for Over-Identification. Hansen’s J Tests follow IV-GMM estimation that allows 
for clustering standard errors on weighted regressions. Degree of freedom of the chi-square test is one. The null 
hypothesis of Hansen’s J tests is that both instruments are valid. Sargan-Basmann Chi-Squared tests following 
unweighted IV-estimation with homoscedastic standard errors generate similar results. See notes to Table 3.2 for 
regression details. 
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Table 3.4. Panel Estimation of the Relationship between Height and Test Theta Scores 
 
  Fixed-Effect Estimation 
VARIABLES  
Reading Theta 
Score  
Math Theta 
Score  
Science 
Theta Score  
Panel A: 5th-8th Grade    
Height -0.002 -0.001 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Panel B: 3rd-5th Grade    
Height -0.001 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Panel C: 1st-3rd Grade    
Height 0.006 0.000 - 
 (0.004) (0.004) - 
Panel D: Kindergarten-1st Grade 0.002 -0.001 - 
Height (0.003) (0.004) - 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Note: We add the days of PE class per week into the control set in order to proxy the effect of physical activities on 
test scores. The fixed-effect estimates are obtained from weighted first difference regressions that allow clustering 
standard errors. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of random-effect.  
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Table 3.5. Impact of School Sports Participation on Academic Performance 
 
 VARIABLES 
Reading  
Theta Score Growth 
Math  
Theta Score Growth 
Science  
Theta Score Growth 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Participation in School 
Sports -0.021*** 0.267** 0.003 -0.059 -0.002 0.116 
 (0.006) (0.132) (0.006) (0.117) (0.016) (0.218) 
1st Stage F-Statistic  16.593  15.813  15.738 
Observations 7,200 7,200 7,250 7,250 7,250 7,250 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes:  Regressions with current height as instrument generate similar results, but with greater standard errors because 
of the lower F statistic in the 1st stage. Regressions that incorporate the conventional value-added model suggested by 
equation (3.2) generate similar results. See the notes to Table 3.2 for regression details.   
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Table 3.6. Investigating the Mechanisms: Relationship between School Sports Participation and 
Health, Academic Discipline, and Academic Self-Concept 
 
VARIABLES OLS  IV  
Panel A: Health   
Parent-Evaluated Health (lower is better) -0.148*** -1.151*** 
 (0.034) (0.445) 
Panel B: Academic Discipline   
Absenteeism from Class (lower is better) -0.055*** -0.335* 
  (0.016) (0.206) 
Panel C: Academic Self-Concept   
SDQ Problem Internalization (lower is better)  -0.011 -1.220*** 
 (0.013) (0.324) 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Notes: In each case, the sample size varies from 6,975 to 7,450. The F-statistics associated with the instruments in the 
first stage are greater than 10 for all dependent variables, ranging from 11.011 to 11.708. The instruments do not pass 
the Hansen J test for Parent-Evaluated Health. Parent-Evaluated Health is a categorical variable scaling from 1 to 5 in 
a decreasing order. Negative marginal effects of Parent-Evaluated Health, Absenteeism from Class, and SDQ Problem 
Internalization indicate improvement in these measures due to participation in school sports. 
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Table 3.7. Investigating the Mechanisms: Relationship between IRT Scores and Health, 
Academic Discipline, and Academic Self-Concept 
 
  OLS Estimation 
VARIABLES  
Reading 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Math 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Science 
Theta Score 
Growth 
Parent-Evaluated Health -0.002 0.002 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) 
Absenteeism from Class -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.073*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) 
SDQ Problem Internalization 0.002 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Notes: Parent-Evaluated Health, Absenteeism from Class, and SDQ Problem Internalization are categorical variables 
where higher values indicate worse outcomes. Negative signs of Parent-Evaluated Health, Absenteeism from Class, 
and SDQ Problem Internalization indicate positive relationships with test scores.  
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Table 3.8. Falsification Tests: Relationship between School Sports Participation and Parental 
Investment 
 
 VARIABLES Health Insurance Coverage Routine Health Care 
 
Probit  
Marg. Effect 
IV-Probit  
Marg. Effect 
Probit  
Marg. Effect 
IV-Probit  
Marg. Effect 
Participation in School Sports 0.002 -0.206 0.053*** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.460) (0.014) (0.198) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Both Health Insurance Coverage and Routine Health Care are binary variables. Health Insurance Coverage 
equals one if the student is covered by any health insurance; Routine Health Care equals one if the student has access 
to routine health care in middle school.  
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Table 3.9. Falsification Tests: Relationship between Height and Favoritism at School  
 
VARIABLES 
Closeness to 
Teachers 
Closeness to 
Classmates 
Growth in Height between 2000 and 2007  0.003 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
Height in 2000  -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
F-Statistic 0.760 1.470 
P-Value 0.473 0.237 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Notes: Scores of closeness to teachers and classmates are ordered from 1 (never close) to 4 (always close). Higher 
values indicate better relationships with teachers and classmates.  
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Table 3.10. Robustness Checks: Control for Childhood Nutritional Intake and General Self-
Concept 
 
 VARIABLES 
Reading Theta 
Score Growth 
Math Theta Score 
Growth 
Science Theta Score 
Growth 
 OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  
Panel A: Control for Childhood Nutritional Intake 
Participation in School Sports -0.021*** 0.270** 0.003 -0.057 -0.002 0.119 
 (0.006) (0.045) (0.056) (0.118) (0.016) (0.224) 
5th Grade Vegetable Intake 0.013 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.000 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) 
F-Statistic  15.057  14.194  14.214 
Panel B: Control for General Self-Concept 
Participation in School Sports -0.024*** 0.286** 0.000 -0.068 -0.009 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.143) (0.006) (0.126) (0.016) (0.223) 
Self-Conception  0.025*** -0.004 0.021*** 0.025** 0.047*** 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) 
F-Statistic  16.201  15.653  15.769 
Panel C: Primary Specification 
Participation in School Sports -0.021*** 0.267** 0.003 -0.059 -0.002 0.116 
 (0.006) (0.132) (0.006) (0.117) (0.016) (0.218) 
F-Statistic  16.593  15.813  15.738 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 5th Grade Vegetable Intake is a categorical variable for the times of children ate vegetables per week in 5th 
grade when survey questions of vegetable consumption first came in availability. It ranges from 1 to 7, with higher 
values recording more frequent vegetable consumption. The Self-Concept is a continuous variable adapted from the 
Rosenberg general self-esteem. Its values are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. A higher 
score indicates better general self-concept.  
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Table 3.11. Subgroup Analysis: Impacts of School Sports Participation on Academic 
Achievement by Gender 
 
 VARIABLES 
Reading Theta Score 
Growth 
Math Theta Score 
Growth 
Science Theta Score 
Growth 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Panel A: Male Students             
Participation in School Sports -0.037 -0.143 0.004 -0.083 0.020 -0.152 
 (0.006) (0.183) (0.012) (0.165) (0.016) (0.650) 
F-Statistic  2.705  2.946  3.187 
Observations 3,600 3,600 3,625 3,625 3,700 3,625 
Panel B: Female Students       
Participation in School Sports -0.006 0.145*** -0.001 -0.133 -0.023 0.163 
 (0.008) (0.053) (0.008) (0.086) (0.022) (0.248) 
F-Statistic  29.431  28.307  28.299 
Observations 3,625 3,625 3,625 3,625 3,625 3,625 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: The F statistic of IV estimation for boys are far below 10, suggesting imprecise estimates for boys, while the 
F statistic of IV estimation for girls are above 10. Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 25. 
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Education Lehigh University 2012-2017
Ph.D. in Economics
Lehigh University 2010-2012
M.S. in Economics
University of International Business and Economics 2006-2010
B.A. in Finance
Research Fields Primary Field: Health Economics
Secondary Fields: Applied Econometrics, Industrial Organization
Publications 1. “The Long-run and Short-run Impacts of Urbanization on Carbon Dioxide
Emissions”, Economic Modelling, 53, 2016, pp. 208-215 (SSCI), (with P. Sheng).
2. “Coal, Oil, and Clean Energy: Which Contributes Most to the Low Energy
Efficiency in China”, Utilities Policy, 35, 2015, pp. 67-71 (SSCI), (with P. Sheng, W.
Xie).
Working Papers 1. Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “The Effect of Participation in School Sports on
Academic Achievement Among Middle School Children”.
2. J. Dearden, Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “Restaurant Wine Pricing”.
3. Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “The Effect of Coverage through State Children’s Health
Insurance Program on Health and Academic Performance of Middle School Children”.
4. P. Sheng, Y. He, Guo, X., “The Impact of Urbanization on Energy Consumption
and Efficiency”.
Work in Progress 1. S. Sherer, C. Meyerhoefer, S-Y. Chou, M. Deily, Guo, X., J. Chen “Provider
Satisfaction with Electronic Health Records and the Implications for Patient Perceptions
of Care Quality”.
Research Grants 1. National Statistical Science Fund, China, Grant No. 2015073 (2015-present)
Investigation of the New Normal in Coordination Between Economic Development
and Environment
PI: P. Sheng Role: Co-Investigator
2. Doctoral Travel Grants for Global Opportunities, Lehigh University (September-
December 2016)
Instructor
Experience
Intermediate Microeconomics: Summer, Fall 2016; Lehigh University
Statistical Methods: Spring 2017; Lehigh University
Conferences and
Seminars
Conference Presentations
J. Dearden, Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “Restaurant Wine Pricing”
• Eastern Economics Association 41th Annual Conference, New York City, NY,
February 2015
• Chinese Economists Society North American Annual Conference, University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, March 2015
• 14th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Drexel University,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania April 2016
Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “The Effect of Coverage through State Children’s Health
Insurance Program on Health and Academic Performance of Middle School Children”
• Eastern Economics Association 42th Annual Conference, Washington D.C.,
February 2016
• Chinese Economists Society North American Annual Conference, Sacramento,
CA, April 2016
• 6th Biennial Conference of the American Society of Health Economists,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, April 2016
Guo, X., C. Meyerhoefer, “The Effect of Participation in School Sports on Academic
Achievement Among Middle School Children”
• Southern Economics Association 86th Annual Meetings, Washington D.C.,
November 2016
• 8th International Symposium on Human Capital and Labor Markets, Central
University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China, December 2016
Professional
Certificates
1. Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) − Passed Level 3, CFA Institute.
2. Financial Risk Manager (FRM) − Passed Level II, GARP.
3. SAS Certified Advanced Programmer, SAS Global Certification Program.
Professional
Service
Referee for Agricultural and Resource Economics Review.
Awards 1. Teaching Assistant of the Year, Lehigh University, Spring 2016
2. Warren York Dissertation Fellowship, Lehigh University, Fall 2014
3. Merit-Based Scholarship, UIBE , 2006-2010
Affiliations American Economic Association, Southern Economic Association, American Society
of Health Economists, Chinese Economist Society.
Skills Computer Software:
STATA, SAS, Mathmatica, LATEX
Languages:
English (proficient) and Mandarin (native)
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